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ABSTRACT
Because o f recent failures, the AICPA Banking Committee has developed a 
normative model citing specific variables for auditors to use in bank audits. This research 
has examined that AICPA model.
In addition, the Auditing Principles Board has identified several areas of concern 
for auditing internal control structures. Research into size and regulation from other 
sources has indicated that both are significant modifiers o f financial models. Regulations 
now require banks and holding companies of more than $500 million in assets to submit 
to an annual independent audit.
The primary purpose of this research was to determine whether the AICPA 
normative model should be expanded to include size and regulation as explanatory 
variables for loan losses in national banks. A secondary purpose was to explore the 
economy of scale enigma in banking. A final purpose was to examine the AICPA model 
to determine which identified variables were statistically significant in explaining loan 
losses.
Analysis o f covariance indicated that size and regulation did not interact to produce 
varying levels o f  effects on loan losses. In addition, a study o f the financial information 
for 236 banks revealed that regulation has no significant impact on bank loan losses. No 
apparent difference was determined between different size holding companies. The
iii
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conclusion was made that regulation requiring audits for banks could not be confirmed as 
explaining a difference in loan loss determination.
Analysis of covariance indicated that size was a significant influence in explaining 
loan losses. A significant difference in loan losses was determined between small and 
medium national banks in this study.
This difference was further explored to reveal that medium banks had larger loan 
losses than small banks. This diseconomy o f scale is inconsistent with most, but not all, 
previous research in this area.
Seven of the AICPA model variables, consumer loans, lagged loan losses, non­
accruing loans, management quality, changes in construction loans, consumer loans and 
non-accruing loans, were found to be significant influencing loan losses. In addition, a 
significant trend variable indicated that the model has missing elements that have not yet 
been determined.
iv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
As the turbulent decade of the 1980s came to an end, the banking industry had 
been shaken to its core. During this period, more banks failed than at any time since the 
Great Depression.1 Regulators and Congressmen have raised questions concerning the 
circumstances surrounding these failures. Combined bailout costs for both the banking and 
thrift industries have been projected by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to reach 
nearly $500 billion.2 While no one has any doubt that the taxpayer will ultimately bear 
the brunt of this debacle, some bank managers are seeking to find legal remedies to address 
these failures. When ambiguities exist as to potential blame for failed institutions, the 
insured independent auditor is the one most likely to be sued for damages. How did the 
public accounting profession find itself in this predicament?
'Sinkey (1998, 726) reported 490 additional failures occurred between 1934 and 1942. In 
contrast, Amos (1992, 805) found that the FDIC closed 831 banks between 1980 and 1988. Sheshunoff 
(1994,1.55) asserted that an additional 365 banks were closed in 1989 and 1990.
’McConnell (1996, 3) stated the projection by the GAO and claimed that 87% will be coming 
from taxpayers' pockets.
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2Issues Involved in the Valuation 
o f Bank Loans
A large portion of bank auditing involves evaluating bank lending practices. If  
poor lending practices exist, the auditor must recognize the low probability of loan 
collection and devalue the loan portfolio accordingly. As part of this procedure, bank 
auditors examine the allowance for loan losses (ALL). The purpose o f the ALL is to 
estimate loan losses needed to reduce the loan portfolio to an amount that is expected to 
be collected. Knapp (1996,89) concluded that the ALL "is typically the most problematic 
account to audit in banking and savings and loan engagements."
The importance of the ALL was illustrated in the collapse of the Penn Square Bank 
in 1982. This failure occurred partially as a result of poor estimates of the ALL by KPMG 
Peat Marwick LLP. Losses of $2 billion were estimated from this failure. Knapp 
(1 9 9 6 , 88) reported that Peat Marwick ultimately paid $45 million to the FDIC and 
$186 million to settle this and other suits resulting from their "allegedly negligent audits 
of several banks and savings and loans."
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Committee on 
Banking and the Auditing Standards Division (1986) immediately reacted to the dilemma 
and partially addressed the problem by publishing an auditing procedural study designed 
to serve as guidance in auditing the credit losses of banks. Auditing procedural studies are 
Category B sources for generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).3
3See Delaney, Adler, Epstein, and Foran (1998, 4-6) for a discussion of GAAP hierarchy as 
defined by the Auditing Standards Board in SAS 69.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3One aspect of this publication defines a normative model for auditors to follow 
when auditing the ALL. This paper examines the adequacy of the AICPA model in 
explaining loan losses.
In addition, two additional variables were tested as part o f an analysis o f 
covariance model to determine if the explanatory power is increased by their presence. 
These variables, bank size and regulatory requirements, are part of the banking internal 
control environment suggested by Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) #55 (1989, 
260). Size has also been suggested to lend an economy of scale to the banking 
environment. As a backdrop for the problem, the issue o f  bad debt expense estimation for 
banks is placed in historical perspective.
Banking Audit History
The Industrial Revolution forever changed business operation in America. Prior 
to the 19th century, most companies were managed by the owner(s). As companies 
progressed in size and complexity, company owners hired stewards to manage their firms. 
Auditing, as a separate accounting function, grew out o f a perceived need by owners to 
evaluate the stewardship o f those agents. As the corporate style of ownership increased, 
the demand for accountability was extended as well. The audit function was an extension 
of this demand.
The banking industry lagged the industrial environment in the demand for auditors 
because of special circumstances. The first circumstance revolved around the fact that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4most banks prior to 1930 were privately held firms. As such, there was little or no demand 
for audits from stockholders or investors.
Regulation of the banking industry began to increase as the dominant bank business 
form changed slowly from partnerships and closely held firms to publicly traded 
corporations. This effect was intensified as a result o f the stock market crash of 1929. 
The Securities Exchange Act o f 1934 created the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) with oversight authority over these corporations. One of the first SEC regulations 
required audits of financial statements for publicly traded corporations.
The second circumstance that initially slowed the demand for audited financial 
services was the radical differences between banking industry practices and generally 
accepted accounting practices (GAAP). Savage (1973) noted that because of these 
differences, auditors were generally precluded from expressing an unqualified opinion 
upon the financial statements o f most banks.
In 1964, the Federal Reserve (FED) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) changed banking industry practice by requiring that GAAP be 
followed more closely in banking practice. In addition, auditing standards began to allow 
for exceptions to GAAP because of industry standards. As auditing standards changed, 
an increasingly larger number o f banks began to be audited. From that change, Savage 
(1973, 5) could report that "by 1971, a majority o f the first hundred largest banks had 
independent audits." Savage continued to note that in 1971, the SEC "required for the 
first time opinion audits of bank holding companies and their consolidated subsidiaries" 
(8).
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5The banking environment began deregulation in the late 1970s as public policy
changed with the intention of increasing competition between financial institutions. With
the passage of (1) The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act o f
1978, (2) The International Banking Act of 1978, (3) The Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, and (4) The Gam-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, the lending industry was substantially deregulated.
Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) partially attributed the bank failures that occurred
during the 1980s upon the deregulated environment created by these enactments. Jeffrey,
Norris, and Witowski (1992, 20) concurred and added two additional factors by stating:
While loan portfolio strength has always been a critical determinant of financial 
condition, the importance of loan evaluation judgment has been magnified by 
economic conditions of the 1980s, by deregulation, and by management quality 
concerns.
The deregulated environment created by these new laws helped to ignite the large 
numbers of bank and S&L failures during the decade o f the 1980s. Jeffrey, et al. further 
stated, "Recent lawsuits have alleged that auditors have failed to detect material 
overstatements o f the value of bank loan portfolios" (20). Lys and Watts (1994, 76) 
reported 207 lawsuits were filed against auditors during this era, representing 42 percent 
o f all lawsuits filed against auditors between 1956 and 1994.
Goldwasser (1995, 21) reported: "Cases against accounting firms have consisted 
largely of claims arising out of the S&L crisis, plus the usual post-recession claims 
consisting of suits arising out of failed bank loans . . . ." Goldwasser contended that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6auditors would be more capable of defending themselves against liability lawsuits if 
proposed tort reform was enacted.
In 1995, Congress passed and subsequently overrode a presidential veto to enact 
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (H.R. 1689). King (1997, 101-2) 
reported that this act mitigates auditor liability by (1) discouraging abusive claims by 
investors, (2) providing more protection against securities fraud, and (3) creating safe 
harbors for auditors who utilize pro forma statements.
1986 Tax Reform Act and Loan Losses
In the middle of this decade of bank failure, Congress revised the Tax Code. The 
1986 Tax Reform Act (86 TRA) (subsequently, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) had 
many effects on business in the United States and was particularly adverse to the banking 
industry. One area o f banking affected by the 86 TRA was the recognition of loan losses 
and the maintenance of a loan loss reserve as part of the core capital of a bank.
Walter (1991, 20) stated that all federal banking regulators "require that all banks 
include in their financial statements an account named allowance for loan losses (ALL)" 
which is used to absorb loan losses both from loans currently identified as bad and from 
apparently good loans that may go bad later. Conway and Siegenthaler (1987,8) reported 
that the loan loss reserve was used "to enable a bank to absorb all future loan losses 
relative to its loan portfolio without impairing capital."
Prior to passage o f the 86 TRA, all banks could use either a percentage of loan 
losses up to a set ceiling for the reserve (percentage method) or a six-year experience
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7moving average (experience method) to estimate their loan losses recognizable for tax 
purposes. The 1986 Tax Code revision required large banks or large holding companies 
(LHC's) with $500 million plus in total assets to deduct only the extent of actual charge- 
offs (specific charge-off method). All other banks and small holding companies (SHC's) 
were allowed to use either the percentage method or the experience method for tax 
recognition of loan losses.4
A conflict emerged after passage o f the 86 TRA because of divergent interests of 
two regulatory agencies, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the U.S. Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC). The IRS wanted adherence to the 86 TRA specific charge-off 
method, while the OCC wanted to rely on a tax concept which allowed regulators to 
determine that a charge-off was authorized and thus allowable (conclusive presumption). 
Von Storch (1992, 17) reported that to resolve the dispute, the Tax Code was amended3 
to state that a "debt charged-off for regulatory purposes is conclusively presumed to have 
become worthless for tax purposes the same year." Thus, loan loss expense determination 
became a matter of regulation, rather than tax law.
Regulation and Size Theory
In several instances (notably the 86 TRA and the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act), 
banking regulations have had differential impacts upon banks because of arbitrary size
4IRC Section 585(b)(1)(A).
SIRC Section 166.
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8specification by regulators and Congress. Why have regulators decided that banks should 
be treated differently because of their size?
With the failure of the Continental Illinois Bank in 1984, the Comptroller o f the 
Currency propounded a new policy that stated that some 11 bank holding companies were 
"too-big-to-fail."6 The origin of this policy began in the Depression era when failures of 
large banks were observed to be contagious. O'Hara and Shaw (1990, 1599) presented 
evidence that this policy was extended to more than the original 11 bank holding 
companies. Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) found that this policy subsidized risk-taking by 
large banks.
Apparently, regulators also were influenced by early research suggesting that an 
economy of scale existed in the banking industry which allowed larger banks to absorb the 
additional costs imposed by regulatory statutes. McEachem (1990, 51) stated: "Size is an 
advantage in delivering financial services to the public because it takes a significant 
investment in both product development and data processing capability to stay competitive 
in today’s market."
Regulation and Holding Company Effect
Another topic o f interest in banking research has been the change in the business 
form of banks. As previously reported, the history of bank ownership began as a small 
group of investors chartering and managing a bank. As the banking industry began to 
grow and prosper after the 1929 Depression, two distinct patterns of operation became
‘In September 1984, The Comptroller of the Currency testified to Congress that 11 bank holding 
companies were "too big to fail."
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9evident. One method that evolved was the use of branch banking in which a large bank 
placed small banking units in dispersed geographical locations around the central unit. The 
main purpose of this decentralization was to reduce competitive pressure by preventing 
other banks from starting operations in the branch bank area.
The second method evolved because of state regulation that forbid branch banking 
in part or in total. In these states, independent banks joined together as holding companies 
to compete more effectively with larger banks. Sinkey (1998, 9) reported that the rapid 
expansion of this type of ownership resulted in 93 percent of all bank deposits being held 
by bank holding companies.
With the inflow of capital into these holding company banks, federal regulatory 
intervention was inevitable. Sinkey (1998, 675) reported that the federal government 
moved to regulate these multi-bank holding companies with The Bank Holding Company 
Act of 1956. In 1979, this Act was amended to bring single bank holding companies into 
the regulatory fold.
The regulatory effect increased with the passage of 1991 FDIC Improvement Act. 
One of the main intentions of this legislation was to improve accountability o f large banks 
and large holding companies. As such, banks and bank holding companies with total 
assets larger than $500 million were required to have audited annual financial statements.
Size. Regulation, and the AICPA
As part of audit planning, the auditor should examine the internal control structure 
of the organization being audited. The knowledge gained from this examination allows the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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firm to set the control risk and the level to which it will rely on the control structure. The 
Auditing Standards Board in writing SAS #55, stated that size and regulatory requirements 
are part of the control environment o f an organization (AICPA, 1989, 260). As such, the 
auditor should consider them in his/her7 assessment of internal controls. The research 
question to be answered is why did the Banking Committee omit these items from 
consideration for auditing the ALL?
Normative Theory and the AICPA 
Model
The AICPA interest in bank auditing resulted in the printing of three bank audit 
procedural guides in 1968, 1983, and 1992. In addition, the Institute has also published 
one procedural study for auditing the allowance for loan losses in 1986. When writing 
these guides, the Banking Committee (1992, ii) attempted to "provide practitioners with 
non-authoritative practical assistance concerning auditing procedures."
In banking, procedures evolved from observations of business practices. Bankers 
noticed that defaulted loans have certain characteristics. From these observations, bankers 
and bank regulators deduced factors that influence loan loss. From these observations, the 
AICPA Committee on Banking (1986,13-14) formulated a normative model which stated 
that in establishing the scope of the work to be performed, the following factors should be 
considered by the CPA:
1. composition o f the loan portfolio,
7All pronouns will refer to both genders from this point forward.
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2. identified potential problem loans, including loans classified by bank regulatory 
agencies,
3. trends in loan volume by major categories, especially categories experiencing rapid 
growth, and in delinquencies, nonaccrual, and restructured loans,
4. previous loss and recovery experience, including timeliness o f charge-offs,
5. concentrations of loans to individuals and their related interests, industries, and 
geographic regions,
6. size of individual credit exposures (few, large loans versus numerous, small loans),
7. degree o f reliance placed on internal loan review and internal audit functions,
8. total amount of loans and problem loans, including delinquent and nonaccrual loans, 
by officer,
9. lending, charge-off, collection, and recovery policies and procedures,
10. local, national, and international economic and environmental conditions,
11. experience, competence, and depth of lending management and staff,
12. results of regulatory examinations, and
13. related party lending.
From an examination of these factors, the Committee must have been heavily 
influenced by finance literature, particularly portfolio theory. Modem portfolio theory 
(MPT) allows bankers to reduce the loan loss risk by diversifying their loan portfolio over 
the broad spectrum of loan types, as well as geographical dispersement.
Komar (1993, 31) reported that "the most common problem leading to excessive 
loan losses is the over concentration of lending exposure to a risky or poorly performing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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industry." Bennett (1984, 1S5) reported that "regulators and management both tend to 
favor a well-diversified loan portfolio to reduce the risks of the bank failing." Bankers 
became acquainted with the concept of portfolio diversification from the works of Sharpe 
(1964) or Fama and Miller (1972). Bennett (1984, 153-5) proposed that MPT allows 
banks to determine the risk premium and price their loans accordingly.
The model proposed by the Banking Committee apparently attempted to develop 
normative accounting theory using MPT. Normative accounting theory has been defined 
by Hendriksen (1982, 56) as "starting from an observation of existing procedures or of 
business practices." Hendriksen (1982, 1) also stated that "all theories are subject to 
modification of abandonment with the development of new information" since accounting 
theory "guide[s] the development of new practices and procedures." Thus, if other factors 
are found to explain the ALL more adequately, the AICPA model should be modified to 
account for this improvement.
In addition, the AICPA model has incorporated the use of economic variables. A 
direct relationship appears to exist between the state of the economy and bank failures. 
As the economy worsens, the number of failed banks tends to increase because of 
increased loan losses. Conversely, Chirinko & Guill (1991, 785) reported "the amount of 
risk faced by depository institutions is of substantial concern for policy-makers because 
of the perceived link between their stability and the performance of the economy."
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Statement of the Problem 
Because audit failures result in large dollar court judgements against audit firms, 
more effective audit techniques must be developed. The area that has had the largest 
impact on bank failure has been loan losses. This study analyzes the ways that loan losses 
have been estimated both in the past and present in an effort to extend a normative audit 
model proposed by the AICPA. An attempt was made to determine whether differences 
in loan losses exist between national banks of different sizes and under different 
regulations. The study posed the following research questions:
1. Does regulation affect loan loss recognition in national banks? This question was 
addressed by the following:
A. Does a difference exist in loan losses between small SHC member banks and 
small LHC member banks?
B. Is there a difference in loan losses between medium SHC member banks and 
medium LHC member banks?
2. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within LHC's due to 
bank size? This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small and medium LHC 
member banks?
3. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within SHC’s due to 
bank size? This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small and medium SHC 
member banks?
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4. Do loan loss recognition differences translate into economies or diseconomies of 
scale in small and medium banks? This question was addressed by the following:
A. Are loan losses of small banks larger than those of medium banks?
B. Are loan losses of small banks smaller than those o f medium banks?
5. Do size and regulation interact in the determination of loan losses in national banks? 
This question was addressed by the following:
Is there a difference in loan loss recognition between small LHC member banks 
and medium SHC member banks?
6. Do the variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee explain loan losses in 
national banks? This question was addressed by the following:
Are the suggested variables statistically significant in explaining loan losses?
Purpose of the Study 
The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether size and regulation help 
explain loan losses in national banks. A secondary purpose was to determine whether 
economies or diseconomies o f scale exist in banking. A third purpose was to investigate 
whether the factors in a normative model proposed by the AICPA helped explain loan 
losses in national banks.
Sources of Data
Primary data used in this study was collected from two database sources. The first 
source was SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly: Ratines and Analysis, which is published 
quarterly by Sheshunoff s Information Service. This journal contains quarterly financial
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data about each insured bank obtained by tabulating the Reports of Call required by FDIC 
regulations of all insured banks.
The second source was the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This governmental 
agency collects economic data in many different formats. The collected data are assembled 
in flat files in a database known as LABSTAT.* The Bureau of Labor Statistics breaks 
down the employment and unemployment figures into several different demographic 
divisions. The division proposed in this study was the unemployment percentages in each 
county.
Secondary sources of data were books, journals, pamphlets, and government 
documents from libraries and government archives. These sources were used as 
background and historical data.
Methods and Procedures for Collection 
and Treatment of Data
The population of national charter banks in 1992 was comprised o f3691 banks,9 
the majority of which were owned by holding companies. Compact Disclosure10 was 
utilized to identify the holding company affiliation of publicly traded banks.
A further refinement of the population was the exclusion of large banks. These 
banks were defined as having more than $500 Million in total assets. Large banks were
*The Bureau of Labor Statistics is listed on the Internet at the following: 
URL:http://stats.bls.gov/blshome.html.
’Compiled by Polk’s Bank Directory (1992, VIE).
l0Compact Disclosure is a relational database that provides information on all publicly traded 
companies that follow SEC guidelines.
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excluded in part because of the large differences between their types o f operations and 
those of small and medium banks. In addition, large banks may add a confounding factor 
to the study because o f the large percentage of their loan portfolio committed to foreign 
loans. Since the vast majority of small and medium banks limit their business sphere to the 
national market, a bias might have been introduced into the study if large banks were 
included. Other sources used to identify population units were Moody's Bank & Finance 
Manual. SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly: Ratines & Analysis, and Polk's Bank 
Directory.
Data Collection
From Compact Disclosure and Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, two lists of 
publicly traded bank holding companies were assembled. One list entitled Large Holding 
Companies (LHC) was comprised of holding companies that owned more than $500 
Million in total assets. The other list, identified as Small Holding Companies (SHC), 
contained holding companies which owned $500 Million in total assets or less. Individual 
banks were identified as belonging to each type holding company. These banks were 
segregated into two classes: (1) small banks having less than $100 Million in total assets 
and (2) medium banks having between $100 Million and $500 Million inclusive in total 
assets.
A random selection of 59 banks was drawn from each subgroup of size and 
affiliation grouping. This number represented at least 20 percent o f the number within 
each group and assured adequate sample size for statistical testing.
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Treatment of Data
The collected data were tabulated into a database and examined for standard 
statistical measurements of central tendency and dispersion (see Appendix I). As part of 
this procedure, the data were examined for outliers. Two observations were identified as 
obvious outliers, which were determined to be misplaced decimal places and corrected.
In addition, tests of normality indicated significant departures from normal 
distributions. Since nonnormally distributed data can lead to incorrect conclusions in 
inferential statistical analysis and may bias the correlation coefficients, Conover (1980, 
337) suggested the use of rank transformation as a way to correct partially for this defect. 
Therefore, the data were ranked to mitigate the nonnormal nature of the distribution.
Methodology
One purpose o f this research was to determine if differences existed in loan loss 
recognition due to size and regulation in the presence of the factors suggested by the 
AICPA normative model. To accomplish this goal, rank analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was the most appropriate statistical procedure to perform hypothesis testing 
on the sample data.
Quade (1967,1198-1200) first recognized that an analysis o f covariance performed 
on ranks was fairly efficient even in the absence o f the usual ANOVA assumptions when 
used with large samples. Puri and Sen (1969,617-18) analytically proved that Quade was 
correct by establishing that ranked ANCOVA results were relatively efficient compared 
to the classic parametric test results. Conover and Iman (1981, 127) state that these
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procedures "may be more robust and powerful than their competitors in non-normal 
situations."
Assumptions
In any study, certain parameters must be set and suppositions made. The following
assumption, limitations and delimitations define those areas.
A. The financial data collected from secondary sources was assumed to be 
accurate.
Limitations
The limitations of the study were as follows:
1. The study was limited to the extent that the selected banks were representative of the 
total population of national banks throughout the nation.
2. The changes in banking regulation and economic conditions may have caused 
impairment of the interpretation of the results of the study.
3. The economic conditions that occurred during this study might have biased the results. 
Readers are advised that the results could be tainted by these conditions.
4. Some variables suggested by the Banking Committee were bank specific and 
constituted proprietary information that could not be elicited from the banks. The 
inability to access this data may have caused biased or limited results.
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Delimitations
The delimitations o f the study were as follows:
1. The population from which the sample banks were drawn was limited to banks which 
had survived the recession and subsequent high loan loss era o f the late 1980s. Hence, 
a survivor bias may have existed among the population.
2. The population from which the sample banks were selected was limited to those banks 
that did not change holding company affiliation during the time period o f the study. 
Since this era was one in which large numbers of banks were acquired by holding 
companies, a selection bias may have occurred as a result of this condition.
3. The study encompassed three years: 1991 through 1993. Caution should be used in 
interpreting the results of this study because the normal operating cycle o f  banks is 
five years.11 Thus, the relatively short time span used in this study may have biased 
the results.
4. The population was defined as publicly traded national banks. The elimination of 
closely held banks from the study may have biased the results.
5. Large banks (over $500 million in total assets) were eliminated from the population. 
This delimitation may prevent inferences to be universal in scope.
Significance of the Study 
This study was performed to expand normative theory concerning the factors that
auditors should use in examining the ALL of commercial banks. An attempt was made to
“See Austin (1992, 38)
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determine whether a normative model proposed by an AICPA industry audit guide 
explains differences in loan loss recognition in the presence o f regulatory and size effects. 
In addition, the possible interaction of regulatory and size effects was explored.
Interest in bank solvency has been highlighted in the last decade by the large 
numbers of bank and thrift failures that have occurred. Some public officials and banking 
groups have criticized the accounting profession for some of these failures due to "faulty 
audits." As a result of ensuing litigation, the accounting profession has suffered serious 
financial setbacks.
To avoid repeating these costly mistakes, new guidance is needed in planning bank 
audits. A better understanding of banking regulations and environment is crucial to 
auditors engaged in performing these audits. Old methods and models need to be 
reexamined to discern what is useful in the modem dynamic global market. Therefore, this 
study examined a normative model for auditing the ALL to evaluate the management 
assertion of valuation of the loan portfolio. In addition, two new factors were added to 
the model and their impact was determined.
The accounting rule-making bodies traditionally have procrastinated in making 
changes to generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. One notable 
exception to this tradition has been the AICPA interest in the banking environment which 
has resulted in the creation and two amended audit guides for banks.12 In addition, the 
AICPA Research Division has shown in the past a particular involvement in auditing the
l2An Industry Audit Guide entitled "Audits of Banks" was written by the AICPA Banking 
Committee in 1968 and subsequently revised in 1983 and 1992.
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ALL account by issuing an audit guide specifically for this audit element.13 This study 
attempted to illustrate to the profession and the AICPA that a new update for auditing the 
ALL account is needed.
Prior research in the area of loan losses has been concerned principally with 
predicting future loan losses. Bankruptcy prediction has also been exhaustively examined. 
Several methodologies have been used to determine the appropriate amount to place in the 
ALL. Another area o f interest has been the use o f  loan classification as a means o f 
determining loan defaults. The effects o f TRA 86 and governmental regulations on loan 
losses have also been explored.14 These topics will be discussed further in Chapter n.
No prior research has been identified that attempted to test whether the model 
proposed by the AICPA has any validity. Jordan (1986, 88) found some of these same 
variables to be statistically significant in his predictive study of loan loss reserves. Several 
of his variables later appeared in the AICPA model. His study suggested that size might 
discriminate loan losses among commercial banks located in Louisiana. However, the 
AICPA model did not utilize his conclusion. This research extended Jordan's findings by 
adding size and regulation to the AICPA model.
l3The Committee on Banking produced "Auditing the Allowance for Credit Losses of Banks," 
an auditing procedure study, in 1986.
l4See especially McNichols and Wilson (1988), Scheiner (1981), and Beidleman (1973).
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Plan of the Study
The remaining chapters of this study will include Chapter n , A Review of Related 
Literature; Chapter m , The Research Design; Chapter IV, Results of the Study; and 
Chapter V, The Summary, Conclusions, and Implications for Future Research.
Seven topics of research will be covered in Chapter II. These topics consist of 
(1) a review of loan loss methodologies, (2) bankruptcy prediction literature, (3) a 
discussion of economy o f scale, (4) tax implications of loan loss recognition by banks,
(5) loan classification research, (6) governmental regulation, and (7) GAAP recognition 
of loan losses.
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CHAPTER H
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This section examines previous banking research. Special attention is given to the 
areas o f loan loss determination, bankruptcy prediction, economy o f scale, tax effects of 
TRA on banks, loan classification, governmental regulation of loan loss recognition, and 
GAAP recognition of loan losses.
The decade of the Eighties was exemplified by industrial deregulation. The 
banking industry was no exception. It preceded other industries by beginning deregulation 
in the late 1970s in response to the inflation o f that era. Holdren, Bowers and Mason 
(1994, 290) found this deregulation to have had a significant impact on asset and liability 
decomposition in their study on 103 banks.
During the 1970s, prime lending rates exceeded 20 percent, while long-term loans 
were locked in at rates under 12 percent. This disparity caused lending rates to soar. 
Deregulation of the banking industry allowed S&L’s and other thrifts to compete directly 
with banks for depositor funds by permitting checking accounts and certificates of 
deposits. These services had been offered only by banks prior to the environmental 
change.
23
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In addition, the rate cap on certificates of deposits (CD’s) was lifted to allow the 
interest rates on these deposits to float with the prime rate. The increased competition for 
deposits forced banks and S&L’s to offer increasingly higher interest rates for long term 
CD rates. Financial institutions paying high CD rates were forced to invest in increasingly 
riskier loans as they attempted to recapture their interest payments. With the end of hyper­
inflation, the surviving institutions paying these extremely high CD rates were forced to 
reevaluate their loan portfolios.
Many financial institutions did not survive the default o f  high risk loans made 
during the inflationary period. This instability in the banking industry did not go unnoticed 
by the banking regulators who noted in the FDIC Annual Report (1983, x) that the 
increased competition " . . .  has given rise to increased risk and greater opportunities for 
banks to fail."
The market instability created by this deregulation allowed banking researchers 
great opportunities for exploration. This chapter reviews current research in seven areas 
to include (1) a review of loan loss methodologies, (2) bankruptcy prediction literature,
(3) a discussion of economy of scale, (4) tax implications o f loan loss recognition by 
banks, (5) loan classification methods, (6) governmental regulation, and (7) GAAP 
recognition of loan losses. The first area examined is methods for determination of loan 
losses.
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Loan Loss Methodologies
Past banking accounting practice has recognized losses from loans prior to the 
actual write-off of the loan. This standard accounting practice resulted in an expense 
account known as the provision for loan losses and a contra asset account known as the 
allowance for loan losses (ALL). Baskin (1992, 95) reported that the GAAP concept 
behind the establishment of the ALL is SFAS 5, "Accounting for Contingencies," which 
requires "losses to be recognized in the financial statements in the period they occur, not 
before or after the loss event."
To accomplish the objectives of SFAS 5, an estimation o f loan loss must be made 
from the loan portfolio. This loss increases both the ALL and the loan loss expense for 
the year. Researchers and bank officers have examined several methods with the intent of 
achieving a better estimation. Some of the more common types are examined in the 
following sections.
Markov Chains
Cyert, Davidson, and Thompson (1962, 296) explored an estimation technique 
known as Markov chains to determine the appropriate allowance amount. Markov chains 
is a mathematical approach that uses the sum of the variance estimates for each cyclic 
repetitive Markov chain to determine an appropriate allowance amount. Markov chain 
methodology was described by Orgler (1975, 92) as being too complex and economically 
unjustified for routine reviews and examinations.
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Migration Analysis
Migration analysis has also been used to estimate future loan losses. Austin (1992,
38) described this tool as a better way to assess how a bank's loan portfolio changes in
response to economic conditions. He stated that he
. . .  used five to seven years' data because this span reflects the economic cycle in 
which the bank operates and includes enough data to smooth out distortions from 
a particularly good or bad year.
While extremely computer intensive, migration analysis has been shown to establish refined
determinations of loan losses by tracking and rating the risk o f charge-offs as they occur.
Kosiek (1992, 7) stated that migration analysis is most effective " . . .  as it
quantifies the movement of homogenous loans to and from individual delinquency
categories." However, Weinstein (1992,14) criticized migration analysis because it is "too
dependent on past performance, which might not be a good indicator o f current market
conditions."
Econometric and Regression Models
Econometric modeling and multiple regression appear tc dominate the methods 
being employed by most researchers. Giroux and Rose (1981, 151) found that 
econometric models and multiple regression analysis were widely used for quantitative 
approaches in predicting economic events.
Graham and Humphrey (1978, 500) investigated the use o f bank examination data 
as predictors of bank net loan losses. They analyzed three models to determine which best 
explained loan losses for 501 banks segregated for size. The findings o f the study
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indicated that predictive models would need to be different for each size o f  bank. This 
finding validates that o f Jordan (1986, 135), which stated that size discriminated loan 
losses in Louisiana for commercial banks.
Hogan, Frankie, and Merz (1987, 65) performed a descriptive analysis o f 93 
variables for a time period of 42 months in an attempt to determine the factors affecting 
loan losses. They stated that "somewhat surprisingly, no previous attempts to build 
aggregate loan loss models could be found in the banking literature." Their findings 
indicated that a model with four variables lagged six months (loan balances, non-accruals, 
initial unemployment claims and non-agricultural employment) explained 83 percent of the 
consumer loan losses. Two of the variables they found to be statistically significant were 
used in the current topic; i.e., non-accruals and initial unemployment claims.
Moore (1992) extended the study of aggregate loan loss determination begun by 
Hogan, et al. (1987). Moore addressed the question of aggregate loan loss determination 
from an auditor's prospective in exploring the population of insured small banks (banks 
with assets of less than $50 million insured by the FDIC) for the year o f 1986.
Moore found that the three loan areas of oil and gas, real estate and agriculture 
were statistically significant. Management also was found to be highly significant and thus, 
was included in the current study as well. However, the model taken as a whole explained 
only 18 percent of the variation in loan losses (118-130).
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O'Connor and Rollauer15 (1988, 34) concluded that in their experience, an 
appropriate allowance could be determined by quantitatively examining the following 
areas: large classified loans, other classified loans, loan concentrations, portfolio trends, 
trends in overdue and nonperforming loans, growth in off-balance-sheet credit risk, 
economic conditions, and risk of error due to individual loans and pools o f loans. Loan 
concentrations and portfolio trends were found by O'Connor and Rollauer to be significant 
and were included in the current research.
Current Practice
Estimating loan losses has tended to be a "gut feel" approach in past banking 
practice. Banks either used a set percentage of loans or a modified aging schedule 
approach in determining the amount to be written off to expense. Current banking 
practice (OCC Banking Circular 201) requires banks to document how the Allowance for 
Loan Losses (ALL) was determined.16
In summary, several methods have been explored by various researchers in efforts 
to determine loan losses with better precision. To date, no one method has been 
established as a "method o f choice." Lack of computer availability hampered initial
l5Mr. O'Connor was at the time of publication of this article the national audit partner-banking 
services for Deloitte Haskins & Sells. Mr. Rollauer was director for bank supervision with the 
Comptroller of the Currency.
“OCC B.C. 201 and its supplement, OCC B.C. 201 (Rev.) (Supplement 1), require national 
banks to provide for "inherent losses" that probably exit in the loan portfolio. In addition, this loss 
estimation should cover only one year's losses. While no particular methodology is specified, 
documentation is required. B.C. 201 emphasizes that loan losses should reflect current economic 
conditions, loan concentrations, trends in loan volume and terms, changes in loan policies and procedures, 
and the experience and depth of the lending staff and management
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research, but technology development has enabled many methods to be used that formerly 
were too "computer intensive."
Bankruptcy Prediction Models 
One element with which auditors contend is the determination o f whether a "going 
concern opinion" is warranted by the financial position of the audit client.17 In essence, an 
auditor is predicting the probability that a client is about to become bankrupt. Lynn and 
Neyland (1992,49) commented that the key determinants in bankruptcy cases involve the 
valuations of assets. These valuation determinations are often the most hotly contested 
items in bankruptcy court as well.
Previously, auditors have used ratio analysis to make this going concern 
determination. Altman (1968, 609) stated that statistical analysis is preferred by 
academicians to ratio analysis. Several researchers have used various models and 
statistical methodologies to make bankruptcy predictions in various business environments.
Altman combined the use of ratio analysis and statistical analysis in his seminal 
work in bankruptcy prediction. Discriminant analysis was used to classify corporations 
based upon certain key financial ratios and whether bankruptcy proceedings had been filed.
Sixty-six firms were selected with half in each of the two categories. Using this 
sample, Altman (1968, 599) determined that 95 percent of the sample could be properly
17SAS 59 (AICPA 1989) requires auditors to evaluate the viability status of their clients as part 
of every audit examination and provides guidance to the auditor on steps to be followed in making such 
decisions.
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classified. He further concluded that by using another sample accurate predictions could 
be made with confidence two years in advance of actual bankruptcy.
Meyer and Pifer (1970,854-5) extended Altman's use of ratio analysis and statistics 
into the banking arena. Their contention was that four factors explain bank failure:
(I) local economic conditions, (2) general economic conditions, (3) quality o f 
management, and (4) honesty o f employees. Meyer and Pifer used 10 financial ratios to 
proxy these factors for the period between 1948 and 1965 for a matched pair sample o f 
30 closed banks and 30 open banks. Their findings indicated that financial positions can 
be accurately evaluated for a lead time o f one or two years (867).
Sinkey (1975, 21) continued Altman's research by analyzing the characteristics o f 
problem banks. In this study, he used discriminant analysis to classify banks into two 
groups: problem banks that have violated a law or regulation or have engaged in unsafe 
or unsound banking practices and non-problem banks. His findings indicated that 
"measures of banking factors such as asset composition, loan characteristics, capital 
adequacy, sources and uses of revenue, efficiency, and profitability are good discriminators 
between groups."
Previous studies have used annual data in the prediction of bankruptcy. Baldwin 
and Glezen (1992, 289) argued that quarterly data might be more reliable and useful in 
predictive models. Twenty-four financial ratios were used as classifying variables in a 
discriminate analysis of 40 bankrupt and 40 nonbankrupt firms for a period from 1977 to 
1983. Their findings indicated that the use of quarterly data allowed predictions o f 
bankruptcy up to nine months earlier than an annual model with no loss o f accuracy.
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Siems (1992) used a linear programming technique known as data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) to quantify the role of management. This research was the first known 
model to incorporate the use ofDEA in the banking industry. In effect, Siems transformed 
the finance theory of the capital assets pricing model (CAPM) to project an "efficient 
frontier" for banks. Siems found that less efficient banks were more inclined to fail. He 
concluded that this methodology could be used to predict bank failures (38).
In summary, the Baldwin and Glezen (1992) study contributed the concept to the 
current topic of quarterly data for bankruptcy prediction. Other studies either used an 
unusual methodology or similar variables to previously studied loan loss research. 
Sinkey’s (1975) findings lend credence to the use o f asset composition, loan 
characteristics, capital adequacy, sources and uses of revenue, efficiency, and profitability 
as theoretical constructs for variable development. Meyer and Pifer’s (1970) development 
of local economic conditions and quality of management led to the use of these variables 
in the current study.
Bankruptcy prediction research has been limited to ex post research. This usage 
severely restricts the validity of the findings. In addition, most researchers have not used 
theory to test for variable significance before using the variables to predict bankruptcy. 
This approach has led to many inconsistences as a result.
Since loans are the largest assets that banks own, a high default rate of these loans 
is the main reason most banks become insolvent. The following area addresses the 
economy o f scale issue that was raised in the Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987) 
study and its relationship to the size effect on loan losses.
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Economy of Scale
A significant number of researchers have investigated the banking industry to 
determine the existence of an economy of scale. The results have been inconsistent at best. 
Reed, Cotter, Gill and Smith (1976, 39) indicated that "although much of the early 
research on bank markets concluded or at least implied that the economies of scale were 
not substantial in banking, more current studies have assigned greater value to bank size." 
Several studies have exhibited similar results as to the existence o f economies o f scale in 
banking, but have differed as to the determination of the bank size where these scales exist 
Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987, 515) found modest economies of scale existing 
in relatively small banks. In contrast, Clark and Speaker (1994,23) found that economies 
of scale existed in banks with up to $1 billion in total assets. These inconsistencies 
suggested that economy o f scale be examined in this study.
As tax law changes, banks are forced to comply with regulation from two areas: 
Internal Revenue Regulations and Office o f the Controller regulations. Conflicts between 
the two areas have often caused problems. The next area will focus on research 
concerning the tax aspects of loan loss recognition.
Implications o f 86 TRA for Loan 
Loss Recognition
Before passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (86 TRA), Hipshman (1987, 90) 
related that all banks were allowed to choose one of two methods for determining the loan 
loss deduction for tax purposes. One allowable method used a chosen percentage o f total 
loans to be written off as uncollectible. The other method was an aging method for loans.
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An experience factor determined the percentage of bad loans to be written off in each 
category.
Both methods provided an opportunity for banks to smooth income and thereby 
delaying or avoiding their tax liability. Goldman (1987, 365) reported that the main 
concern that triggered the 86 TRA reform was the ability o f taxpayers (banks) to deduct 
losses prior to their occurrence.
With the passage of the 86 TRA, banks with more than $500 million in total assets 
(large banks) could no longer use the reserve method of accounting for loan losses. Ator 
and Claytor (1987, 104) reported that large banks had to recapture their loan loss reserve 
against income over a four-year period or write down the closing balance against losses 
on outstanding loans as they occurred.
Weld (1991) hypothesized that bank foreclosure behavior would be changed by the 
passage of the 86 TRA. To test these hypotheses, he regressed net loans charged off 
against the type of bank, state located, size of bank (large or small), demand deposits, 
return on assets, net interest spread, securities gains or losses, and annual regional retail 
sales.
Weld (1991,26) found that the regulation variable and the economic variable were 
so highly correlated as to make the economic variable expendable. Only return on assets 
and the state variable for Louisiana were significant, even though the model explained 56 
percent of the variation in loan losses.
Weld used Chow tests on the 167 banks that comprised the sample to determine 
whether small banks and large banks changed their behavior because of 86 TRA. He failed
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to reject the hypothesis of no difference in behavior for either large or small banks due to 
the passage of the 86 TRA (30).
Originally, the 86 TRA required large banks to use the specific write-off method 
which allowed a tax deduction for a bad debt only in the year the loss occurred. A 
controversial aspect o f this recognition was that regulators allowed banks to recognize the 
loss if examiners ordered or would have ordered the write-off. Congress recognized the 
dilemma and modified the 86 TRA with IRC Section 166 which O'Donnell and 
Mastrangeli (1992, 17) summarized as "debt charged-off for regulatory purposes is 
conclusively presumed to have become worthless for tax purposes the same year." This 
change in regulation resolved conflicts between the IRS and the OCC.
To summarize, the 86 TRA has had a major effect upon the way that banks 
determine loan losses for tax purposes. Previous methods have been disallowed for large 
banks and other banks who belong to large holding companies. This difference in tax 
treatment for banks based on size is a major area of interest in the current research.
Loan Classification Methods 
The next area o f literature to be explored was that o f  loan classification. Banks 
and bank examiners typically rank loans based upon the assessed probability of default. 
Wu (1969, 704-5) stated that loan classifications are good predictors of loan write-offs.
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The classifying of loans by degrees of risk is practiced extensively in banking and 
bank literature. In performing this task, bank examiners are following the classification 
system recommended by the OCC.1*
Dietrich and Kaplan (1982, 18-19) report that "estimates o f  default risk facilitate 
the internal evaluation and review of lending operations and help to  determine loan loss 
reserves for financial reporting." They further state that this classification is performed "by 
loan officers, auditors, and bank examiners."
In an attempt to address the limitations of Bentson's study, Marlin (1968) is 
reported by Benston and Marlin (1974, 36) to have replicated this study by using a 
stratified sample of banks o f all sizes, types, and geographical locations for a four-year 
period (1963-1966). The most significant finding of this study was the negative 
relationship between substandard loan ratio (SLR) and bank size. Three explanations were 
formulated for this finding. The first noted that small banks loaned a greater percentage 
of their assets to small borrowers who generally are riskier clients. Another explanation 
is that small banks are unable to diversify their investment portfolio geographically and are 
thus at more risk from local economic conditions. The third explanation given concerned 
the cutoff level in the examination process.
Wojnilower (1962,37) performed a descriptive study into the quality ofbank loans 
using a sample consisting o f 60 state member banks of all sizes from New York, 
Philadelphia, and Atlanta for a 10-year span between 1947-1957. He concluded that there
'*The Comptroller's Handbook of Examination Procedure (1978) lists 3 "classified" loan 
categories: Substandard, Doubtful, and Loss.
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are varying degrees of risk associated with bank lending depending upon industry 
differences and size. In addition, he credited changes in the economy for much o f the loan 
loss by stating:
Even if all o f a bank's customers have superior credit ratings now, that bank may still 
be incurring above-normal risks if these borrowers happen to be concentrated in 
lines of business that are particularly vulnerable to cyclical adversity.
In summary, loan classification methods have been used to allow managers to 
quantify default risk by grouping similar loans. Many researchers in the classification area 
have contributed variables of interest to the current topic o f study. Dietrich and Kaplan 
(1982) stated that bank officers, auditors and examiners function to establish loan 
classifications. Marlin’s (1968) finding on size reinforced the size effect under study. He 
also found that local economic conditions were significant. Wojnilower (1962) found a 
relationship between size and risk in banks.
The next area to be examined is governmental regulation of allowance for loan 
losses. Regulatory accounting practices (RAP) established by the Comptroller of the 
Currency and the FDIC are binding on national banks. These practices differ in the 
recognition of loan losses from those established for tax purposes. This area will explore 
this difference and its implications on loan loss determination.
Governmental Regulation of ALL
Conway and Siegenthaler (1987, 5) reported that use o f loan loss reserves began 
with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1921. This law was written to allow bad debt 
expense to become a deduction to income after the passage o f the Sixteenth Amendment
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to the Constitution in 1913. The 1921 Act allowed banks to deduct bad debt expenses 
above actual losses for tax purposes. The excess expense was added to a reserve account 
to cushion future bank operations against excessive losses. Due to inadequate Internal 
Revenue guidelines about the definition of "reasonableness" (a concept that capped the 
reserve for loan losses), most banks continued to use the simpler direct charge-off method.
Conway and Siegenthaler (1987, 5-6) also stated that tax incentives were given to 
banks to establish reserves in 1947 and 1954. The Treasury Department established 
guidelines to help determine the proper amount to recognize as loss for tax purposes. 
Banks were allowed to recognize three times their loss experience over a 20-year period 
since 1927.
Banks were not required by generally accepted accounting principles to deduct 
loan losses from operating income during this period. Only after passage of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 were banks required to flow loan losses through the reserve account 
and be included in the operating statement. Minimums were also set for additions to the 
reserve account.
The 86 TRA changed the manner in which large banks and LHC banks with more 
than $500 Million in total assets were required to recognize loan losses. Previous 
deductions were now required to be recaptured.
In addition, new loan losses could be charged off to loss only as they occurred. 
This method was modified with the passage of IRC 166 which allowed banks to deduct 
for tax purposes any loans which regulators had ordered charged off for regulatory 
purposes.
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On May 31, 1985, the OCC issued Banking Circular 201 (1985, 1) which 
addresses the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses. As part of this circular, the OCC 
directed that "The ALL must be maintained at a level sufficient to absorb the loss inherent 
in the loan portfolio."
In 1992, the OCC modified Banking Circular 201 (1992.4) by stating that only the 
"unconfirmed losses that may arise from events that have not yet occurred" be reflected 
by the chosen methodology. In addition, the suggestion was made that banks should 
"review and adjust historical loss rates for the above factors on a pool-by-pool basis.” 
RAP has traditionally determined loan losses. Lately, GAAP has become 
increasingly important in bank accounting. The final section addresses GAAP for loan loss 
recognition in banking.
GAAP Recognition of ALL
The AICPA has also been engaged in policy formation for loan loss determination.
The Banking Committee of the AICPA (1968,1983,1992) has written procedural manuals
for auditors engaged in examining banks. The Committee stated that "for purposes of
expressing an opinion on the financial statements, the CPA must be concerned with the
amount at which loans are stated in the aggregate" (65). In addition, they stated:
The audit procedures should be designed to determine the overall collectibility of the 
entire portfolio and should be performed primarily on a test basis . . . the CPA 
should consider the composition o f the loan portfolio, growth trends being 
experienced, unspecific loan classifications, previous loss and recovery experience, 
management's procedures for loan review and classification, and subjective factors, 
such as economic and environmental conditions (63).
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The AICPA Banking Committee (1986) has also issued an audit procedure study
for credit losses o f banks. In this study, the Committee stated:
Management's considerations should include such factors as changes in the nature 
and volume of the portfolio, overall portfolio quality, loan concentrations, trends in 
the level o f delinquent and classified loans, specific problem loans, and current and 
anticipated economic conditions that may affect the borrower’s ability to pay (13).
The Committee further stated that in establishing the scope of the work to be performed,
the CPA normally (emphasis mine) considers the following factors:
(1) Composition of the loan portfolio;
(2) Identified potential problem loans, including loans classified by bank 
regulatory agencies;
(3) Trends in loan volume by major categories, especially categories experiencing 
rapid growth, and in delinquencies, nonaccrual, and restructured loans;
(4) Previous loss and recovery experience, including timeliness o f charge-offs;
(5) Concentrations of loans to individuals and their related interests, industries, 
and geographic regions;
(6) Size of individual credit exposures (few, large loans versus numerous, small 
loans);
(7) Degree of reliance placed on internal loan review and internal audit functions;
(8) T otal amount of loans and problem loans, including delinquent and nonaccrual 
loans, by officer;
(9) Lending, charge-off, collection, and recovery policies and procedures;
(10) Local, national, and international economic and environmental conditions;
(11) Experience, competence, and depth of lending management and staff;
(12) Results of regulatory examinations; and
(13) Related party lending (29).
In summary, RAP and tax regulations were effectively reconciled with the passage 
of IRC 166 which stated that losses recognized due to regulatory examination were 
determined to be recognized for tax purposes as well. In addition, the AICPA concurred 
with RAP. In the AICPA audit guide for auditing the ALL, a normative model was 
described which was the foundation for the current research. Much of this model comes
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from prior research in previously discussed areas. This normative model was used as a 
template for the model used in the research project being constructed.
This discussion o f governmental policy procedures on loan losses concludes the 
literature review. Chapter HI provides a discussion of the procedures performed for the 
development of a model that explains loan losses in National Banks. This model will be 
tested using Analysis of Covariance to determine potential differences in loan losses due 
to regulation and size. The variables identified in Chapter II provided the basis for the 
development of this model.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
As stated in Chapter I, one purpose of this research was to explore the 
relationships between the variables suggested by the AICPA and net loan losses. The 
normative model constructed by the AICPA implies that all banks are affected universally 
by the same set of variables. If this assumption is incorrect, auditors may improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness by examining other variables. Jeffrey, Norris, and Witowski 
(1992, 20-21) reported that "when performing a bank audit, the independent audit firm 
spends between 25-50 percent of the audit time on loan evaluation and the estimation of 
the Allowance for Credit Losses." To increase audit efficiency and effectiveness, more 
knowledge about how these variables interact in the determination o f loan losses would 
be helpful. Auditors could increase efficiency by examining only those variables useful in 
explaining loan losses for the particular size bank or holding company being audited. If 
other variables are not being examined that could explain loan losses, auditors might be 
losing effectiveness and thereby increasing their liability.
The procedures used by this researcher in the attempt to accomplish these 
objectives are explained in this chapter. The following topics will be discussed in the
41
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remainder o f this chapter: Hypotheses, Sources o f Data, Variables Used as Part o f the 
Normative Model, and the Empirical Methodology.
Hypotheses
Research questions raised in Chapter I are restated as research hypotheses in the 
following section to determine whether differences in loan losses exist due to size and/or 
regulation effects.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Size
An initial purpose was to determine if loan loss determination was altered by bank 
size in the presence of the AICPA model. Size has been established to be a significant 
modifier of models in both financial and accounting studies.19 In the banking environment, 
the capitalization ratio and loan portfolio potential are determined by bank size.
In addition, several studies have suggested that bank size has determined risk 
preference because of regulatory body policy interference, i.e., the "too big to fail" 
policy.20 This policy was established by the Comptroller of the Currency in a speech to 
Congress in which he articulated the concept that a select number of large banks (originally 
eleven) would not be allowed to fail because of the contagion effects that their failure 
would have on the national banking system. Boyd and Gertler (1994, 2) reported that 
large banks have been insulated from their loan losses by this action and have taken greater
l9See Boyd & Gertler (1994) for a discussion of size in banking,
"Especially Samolyk (1994), Read, Bartsch, and Raghunandan (1994), andDemsetz and Strahan
(1995).
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risks as a result. The AICPA did not address the issue o f whether bank size should be a 
factor in determining loan losses. This issue needed to be addressed because of the lack 
of authoritative guidance.
Size Effect Hypotheses: Within LHC’s.
lHo: Bank size as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small and 
medium LHC member banks as to loan loss determination.
lHa: Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium LHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.
Size Effect Hypotheses: Within SHC’s.
2Ho: Bank size as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate small and 
medium SHC member banks as to loan loss determination.
2Ha: Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium SHC 
member banks as to loan loss determination.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Scale
A second purpose o f this study was to examine whether size in banking creates an 
economy of scale. Contradictory results have been obtained from previous research. 
Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987, 515) found modest economies o f scale in small 
banks. Clark and Speaker (1994,23) reported economies of scale in banks up to a billion 
dollars in assets. Jagtiani and Khanthavit (1996, 1285-6) found that after 1990, 
diseconomies of scale existed in large banks.
Divergent research results make further investigation into "economies of scale" 
desirable. Research utilizing loan losses may provide some new insights in this area. Since
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no research has been discovered that utilized loan losses as a proxy for economy o f scale, 
a need for guidance is perceived.
Scale Hypotheses: Within LHC’s.
3Ho: Loan losses are the same for small and medium LHC member banks.
3Hal: Loan losses are more in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member 
banks.
3Ha2: Loan losses are less in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member 
banks.
Scale Hypotheses: Within SHC’s.
4Ho: Loan losses are the same for small and medium SHC member banks.
4Hal: Loan losses are more in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member 
banks.
4Ha2: Loan losses are less in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member 
banks.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Regulation
Another purpose of this study was to examine whether loan losses in national
banks could be explained more fully by incorporating an audit requirement in addition to
the AICPA model. Since the audit function examines the timing o f loan loss recognition,
audited banks should have less latitude in determining the recognition period for the loss.
Both the 86 TRA and the 91 FDIC Improvement Act made provisions for audit
requirements based on size and holding company affiliation that affect the way banks
recognize loan losses. Because the Banking Committee did not investigate this area, the
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issue needs examination to determine if modification o f the normative model is required
to include the effect of audit regulation.
Regulation Effect Hypotheses:
Small Banks.
5Ho: Audit regulation as part of the AICPA model does not help differentiate small LHC 
and small SHC member banks.
5Ha: There is another model which includes regulation requiring an audit that
differentiates loan losses for small LHC member banks from small SHC member 
banks.
Regulation Effect Hypotheses:
Medium Banks.
6Ho: Audit regulation as part of the AICPA model does not help differentiate medium 
LHC and medium SHC member banks.
6Ha: There is another model which includes regulation requiring an audit that
differentiates loan losses for medium LHC member banks from medium SHC 
member banks.
Need for Additional Guidance Concerning 
Interaction o f Regulation and Size
When using a dual factor analysis of variance (of which ANCOVA is an extension), 
the first item to test is the interaction o f the two factors. Hatcher and Stepanski (1994, 
249) reported that in nonexperimental research "an interaction is a condition in which the 
relationship between one predictor variable and the criterion is different at different levels 
o f the second predictor variable." As a result, if an interaction is present in single factor 
models, only simple effects can be tested.
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Interaction Hypotheses:
Small LHC and Medium 
SHC Banks.
7Ho: Audit regulation and size do not interact as part of the AICPA model to 
differentiate small LHC and medium SHC member banks.
7Ha: There is another model which includes bank size and regulation requiring an audit
that differentiates loan losses in small LHC and medium SHC member banks.
Interaction Hypotheses:
Small SHC and Medium 
LHC Banks.
8Ho: Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to 
differentiate small SHC and medium LHC member banks.
8Ha: There is another model which includes bank size and regulation requiring an audit
that differentiates loan losses in medium LHC and small SHC member banks.
Sources o f Data
The data were collected from five sources. Population selection was made by 
compiling the bank holding companies listed by both Moody's Bank and Finance Journal 
and Compact Disclosure database. Further analysis was performed using these two 
sources to determine the banks held by these holding companies. Refinement of the 
population was made by referencing both the SheshunofFs Bank Quarterly: Ratines & 
Analysis Journal and Polk's Bank Directory. Financial data for the variables o f the selected 
sample of banks were derived from the SheshunofFs Bank Quarterly: Ratings & Analysis 
Journal (1990-1994) and from LABSTAT. the Bureau of Labor Statistics database. The 
following portion of this paper will discuss additional procedures for selecting population,
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sample, and variables, as well as the empirical and statistical methods employed in the 
analysis of the data.
Population Selection
National charter commercial banks o f both small and medium size banks were 
chosen as the population of interest. National banks are the most heavily regulated type 
o f institution, being supervised by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Federal Reserve, as well as the FDIC. National charter banks usually have annual 
examinations by OCC examiners.
A bank examination consists o f assuring that banks are in compliance with 
regulations imposed by the regulatory agency (i.e., Federal Reserve, OCC, state banking 
boards, etc.) as well as the FDIC, the bank's insurance agent. Customarily, the Federal 
Reserve and FDIC depend upon the OCC examination and therefore rarely examine 
national banks.
When a problem bank is recognized, the FDIC can intervene to issue cease and 
desist orders, change managers, or close the bank. With such close scrutiny of national 
banks, the probability of income smoothing by manipulating the ALL is diminished. In 
addition, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991,653) reported that firms with audit committees are 
less likely to manipulate earnings, a form o f income smoothing.
Lapidus (1980, 2) stated that in contrast to national banks, state Federal Reserve 
member banks are subject to examination by both state bank examiners, as well as annual 
examinations by the Federal Reserve. Conversely, state chartered nonmember banks are
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examined by the FDIC and state examiners. Since each agency has different capital 
requirements and loan write off determinations, there is a difference between state and 
national banks that could confound the study. Therefore, state banks were not included 
in the population.
The population of national banks was then subdivided into two areas to be studied: 
those belonging to LHCs and those belonging to SHCs. Banks affiliated with the LHCs 
and SHCs were identified by accessing Compact Disclosure. During the search process, 
these banks were fUrther defined as being either small or medium. Large banks were not 
included in the study because of the differences in lending practices. One of these 
practices is the lending o f large sums to foreign countries. Since this type of loan carries 
with it a high default rate, inclusion of this size of institution might have introduced bias 
into the study. Missing observations from Compact Disclosure were identified using 
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, as well as Polk's Bank Directory.
Sample Data
Two hundred and thirty-six banks were randomly selected from LHC’s and SHC’s. 
These banks were further divided by size into medium and small banks. The sample data 
for the selected banks were taken from two sources. Quarterly financial data were 
selected from SheshunofFs The Bank Quarterly Ratines. Economic data was downloaded 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics database: LABSTAT.
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Variables for Selected Banks
Variables used to test all listed hypotheses were collected for the two classes of 
national banks: LHC member and SHC member. In addition, these two classes o f holding 
companies were further divided into two partitions in each class: small and medium bank 
size. Small banks were defined as having less than $100 million in total assets over the 
three-year period o f study. Medium banks were defined as having at least $100 million, 
but no more than $500 million in total assets during the study period. This research area 
has had incongruent results previously because researchers have not defined a consistent 
standard size for small, medium, and large banks.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable Net Charge-Offs (NCO) was the actual loan losses incurred 
by the selected banks. These loan losses were measured as the quarterly charge-offs minus 
any recoveries. In addition, the losses were reported as a percentage of average loans to 
eliminate the size effect.
Moore (1992, 42) chose not to use actual loan losses in his study. His reasoning 
was that some banks write off problem loans immediately while others carry them as 
nonperforming. To correct for this, he added the total loan write-offs to the total 
nonperforming loans, subtracted the recoveries, and divided the results by total loans. 
Since all nonperforming loans are required by examiners to be expensed eventually, NCO 
was determined to be a more appropriate dependent variable than the one used by Moore.
«
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Independent Variables Suggested 
bv the AICPA
The first factor suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee was the Composition
of the Loan Portfolio. This factor is actually a measure of the non-systemic risk that a
bank accepts when investing in monetary lending. Copeland and Weston (1988, 198)
defined non-systemic risk as a measure o f covariance between returns on the investment
and the market portfolio. Fama (1976), Sharpe (1964), and other financial theorists
contended that financial analysts reduce non-systemic risk by diversifying the loan
portfolio. Since market changes affect different businesses in various ways, bankers
diversify their loan portfolio by lending across a wide spectrum of business types, so that
market changes will have less effect on loan losses. Lyons (1994, 36) reported that:
By increasing the number of borrowers in a loan portfolio, management reduces the 
importance of any single borrower to the loan portfolio and therefore, the potential 
impact of loan loss from a single borrower on that portfolio.
The loan portfolio factor was measured by four levels represented by the principal 
loan types made by banks. To control for size, each of the variables was divided by total 
assets. The four levels o f loans were (1) construction loans, (2) commercial real estate,
(3) consumer loans, and (4) agricultural loans.
In addition, this factor also measured the concentration ofloans to related interests, 
industries and geographic areas, since banks largely loan within their customers' area 
(disregarding participating loans). The principal purpose of this factor was to capture the 
quality of the loan portfolio diversification for each bank.
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The second factor studied is Trends in Loan Volume and in Delinquencies. This 
factor is a trend variable that measures the changes in loan concentration and the effect of 
the changes on loan losses from period to period. In effect, this factor is the constant 
change in portfolio mix that Foster (1986, 312) suggested should occur due to different 
risk assessments (changes in beta)21 which occur in the market over time.
This factor was measured by four variables which reflected the changes in loan 
concentration in each of the four principal loan categories and one variable that reflected 
changes in delinquencies. Each loan concentration variable was quantified as being the 
percentage change in loans in that category controlled for size by dividing by the change 
in total assets. The four loan concentration levels were (1) change in construction loans, 
(2) change in commercial real estate, (3) change in consumer loans, and (4) change in 
agricultural loans. The delinquency component was measured by the change in nonaccrual 
loans as a percentage of gross loans.
The third factor addressed was a composite o f Potential Problem Loans and 
Results of Regulatory Examination, two areas the AICPA suggests as being normally 
audited. Potential Problem Loans are defined by Sheshunoff (1994, 2-6) as a measure of 
asset quality which reflects "a bank's ability to make and collect loans. Nonaccrual loans 
are a Result of Regulatory Examination. Examinations may result in potentially bad loans 
being classified as "substandard," "doubtful," or "loss." Loss classifications result in direct 
charge-offs, while "doubtful" may result in a nonaccrual classification.
2lBeta is a finance term which measures the risk of individual assets of a portfolio to the entire
market
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This classification factor was measured by nonaccrual loans. This factor was 
quantified as nonaccrual loans and leases and was controlled for size by dividing by the 
gross loans.
The next factor included in the AICPA model is Economic Conditions. Graham 
and Homer (1988, 10) found that "an adverse economy was a significant factor in 35 
percent of the (bank) failures." This factor should be a three level factor due to national, 
international, and local economic effects on loan losses. National effects should be 
measured by the loan concentration variables and thus would be redundant to the study in 
the aggregate. In other words, the national economic effect will be eliminated by 
randomization. International economic effects occur mainly in large banks that lend on the 
international markets. Large banks were eliminated from the study because of the 
confounding effect that these foreign loans might have upon the study.
The local economic effect was the only factor that was addressed. Ford (1994,25) 
reported that "changes in annual failure rates reflect variations in general economic 
conditions and correlated closely with changes in other measures of economic health such 
as the unemployment rate and gross domestic product." In addition, Hooks (1992, 1-2) 
found that employment in Texas and Louisiana mirrored bank profitability during the 
1980s.
This factor level was measured by the local county unemployment rate. The data 
were obtained from the National Bureau ofLabor Statistics (NBLS) database, LABSTAT. 
The NBLS began the collection of County level unemployment data in 1990.
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The fifth factor studied was the Experience, Competence & Depth ofManagement. 
As loan officers become more experienced and more competent in their evaluation of loan 
applications, the number of "bad" loans made should decrease with a corresponding 
decrease in loan losses. Graham and Homer (1988, 8) in a study sponsored by the OCC 
found that" ... the policies and procedures of a bank's management and board o f directors 
have the greater influence on whether a bank will succeed or not."
Spadaford (1988, 21-22) identified poor asset management as one o f the causal 
factors leading to bank failure. Boffey and Robson (1995, 66) further expounded on this 
idea by stating:
A key reason why the correct management of credit risk is so important is because 
banks have such a limited capacity to absorb loan losses . . . The low risk-low 
marginnature of banking business is something that has been written about for some 
time.
This single level factor was measured by the President's weighting, an indirect 
management measure suggested by SheshunofFs rating analysis. Sheshunoff (1994, n.3) 
calculated the scores for this measure by using weights obtained from a survey o f bank 
presidents. The presidents were asked to estimate the percentage weight o f importance 
for each of the CAMEL22 areas. The weights for all areas except management were then 
multiplied by four which yielded a weighted base. These bases were then standardized by 
rank and their total rank scores summed to yield a weighted total score. Comparison of 
this weighted total score versus a percentile curve determined the final weights. The scale 
o f this variable was from 0 to 99, with 99 being considered the best.
“CAMEL is an acronym which represents (1 )Capital adequacy, (2) Asset quality, (3)Management,
(4)Eamings, and (5)Liquidity. CAMEL ratings are a common bank rating measure.
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A similar variable suggested by the AICPA indicates the need to study Loan Losses 
as a Function of the Loans made by each Individual Loan Officer. While this variable 
might be appropriate for an individual bank in determining effectiveness of loan officers, 
implementation in an aggregate model would be difficult because o f the inability to collect 
proprietary data.
Another variable examined was that o f Previous Loss and Recovery Experience. 
The AICPA Committee on Banking (1992, 63-4) suggests that past losses are indicative 
of the risk preference o f the lending institutions. In addition, recoveries illustrate how well 
loan officers recognize and remedy problem loans. This variable was measured by lagging 
the net loan loss by one period.
Four additional variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee (1992,64- 
5) as being pertinent to the ALL audit, but not included in the study, were (1) Size of 
Individual Credit Exposures, (2) Related Party Transactions, (3) Degree of Reliance 
placed on Internal Loan Review and Internal Audit Functions, and (4) Lending, Charge- 
off, Collection, and Recovery Policies and Procedures. All four variables are easily seen 
to be bank specific and thus are not useful for an aggregate decision. These four variables 
were not included in the model because of this limitation.
Independent Variables Suggested bv 
Other Research
Two variables suggested by the Auditing Principles Board as being important to 
internal controls structures are size and regulation. Neither was examined by the AICPA 
Banking Committee. In addition, econometric modeling often inadvertently omits
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variables. To test for this, a trend variable is included to absorb the random error of 
omitted variables. These variables are introduced in the following sections.
Regulation. The banking industry has been considered one of the most heavily 
regulated in the United States. While this situation was attenuated partially by the bank 
reform acts passed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the industry continues to have 
enormous regulatory supervision. One aspect o f this regulation pertinent to this research 
is the requirement by the OCC that national banks over $500 million in assets or whose 
holding company has more than $500 million in assets submit to an annual external audit 
each year.
In earlier research, Amos (1992,810) found that regulatory changes did not cause 
bank closings during the 1980s, but suggested that data for later years might need to be 
examined. Hollingsworth and Rose (1995,27) extended the research of regulation effect 
in banking and determined that the 86 TRA was linked to changes in bank asset quality 
during the late 1980s.
This research extends the study of regulation by an examination o f the effects of 
OCC rulings and 86 TRA enactments on loan losses o f LHC member banks. These banks 
were hypothesized to have been affected by the rulings and regulation which requires these 
banks to submit to an annual external audit. The SHC member banks were hypothesized 
not to be impacted since they were not required to be audited. Large banks of more than 
$500 million in assets were specifically excluded from the study due to the confounding 
differences in operations between small and medium banks and those o f large banks.
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Size. Another area of interest in banking is the impact of size on bank efficiency. 
Do banks become more efficient as they grow larger? The existence o f  an economy of 
scale in banking has continued to elude researchers. Samolyk (1994,2) reported that "the 
phenomenon o f bank holding companies emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as a response 
to restrictions on the scale and scope of banking activities."
Boyd and Gertler (1994) hypothesized that large banks were responsible for the 
poor performance of the industry during the 1980s. They attributed this to two factors: 
"deregulation and financial innovation led to increased overall competition for the banking 
industry" and "the existing regulatory environment tended to subsidize risk-taking by large 
banks more than that by small banks" (2). They concluded that even "after regional 
conditions are controlled for, size still matters in explaining loan losses" (3). In addition, 
they contend that "generally speaking, smaller banks adopt more conservative asset and 
liability positions than do large banks" (8). They advanced the scale controversy by 
concluding that the smallest banks (under $50 million in assets) performed poorly because 
of an inability to utilize scale economies (21).
Samolyk (1994, 3) reported that "differences in banking conditions also appear to 
be associated with bank size and holding company affiliation." In contrast to Boyd and 
Gertler, she found that "relatively small banks ($100 million to $500 million in assets, 1987 
dollars) seem to have turned in the best performance in terms of profitability and asset 
quality" (14).
Demsetz and Strahan (1995,23) validate Samolyk's findings in an indirect manner. 
In their study based on small and large holding companies, they found that after 1991 an
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inverse relationship between size and risk began to be statistically significant in holding 
company banks. They concluded that "changes in the regulatory climate could explain 
changes in the relationship between size and risk." This relationship explains Samolyk's 
(1994, 16) finding that smaller banks outperformed larger banks in this period due to the 
existence of a direct relationship between risk and return.
Trend. In any econometric model, the omission o f a relevant variable causes biased 
estimates of the coefficients which precludes the use o f standard tests of significance. If  
this omitted variable exhibits trends over time, Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987, 357) 
state that the preferred methodology is to introduce a trend variable which "picks up the 
effect of these omitted variables and thereby reduces the potential bias in the coefficients 
of the other variables included in the equation." They elaborate by stating the trend 
variable "detrends" the data such that "the coefficients o f the other variables in the 
equation will be explaining not changes in the level of the dependent variable, but instead 
explaining deviations of the dependent variable from its trend value."
To incorporate the methodology of Johnson, Johnson, and Buse (1987, 357), the 
model was expanded to include a trend variable. This variable was defined to reflect the 
quarter and year in which the data originated. A statistically significant trend variable will 
reduce bias, but may indicate that an important relevant variable has been omitted from the 
data set.
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Empirical Methodology 
This section describes the statistical procedures used to analyze the hypotheses 
elaborated in the first section of this chapter. Statistical procedures were performed using 
SAS/STAT.23
The Analysis o f Covariance Model
Y  = p +  a  + P + D a p t + SP(X-x) + €
Y NET CHARGE-OFFS RECOGNIZED
P GRAND MEAN
a  = TWO LEVEL FACTOR REPRESENTING BANK SIZE, SMALL AND MEDIUM
P TWO LEVEL FACTOR REPRESENTING HOLDING COMPANY AFFILIATION
D ap, = INTERACTION OF SIZE AND HOLDING COMPANY AFFILIATION
6  = RANDOM ERROR
Analysis of Covariance
The statistical method chosen to analyze the research area was analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA). Puri and Sen (1969) and Quade (1967) reported that ANCOVA 
functioned by measuring the effect o f a class or classes of variables on the dependent 
variable in conjunction with a number o f covariates. Wildt and Ahtola (1978, 9) stated in 
the regression perspective case where the covariates and categorical independent variables 
are of equal interest "the researcher may wish to examine the effect or contribution o f each 
independent variable (both quantitative and qualitative), after adjusting or correcting for
“SAS/STAT is a registered trademark for statistical software marketed by SAS Institute Inc.
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the effects of all other independent variables.” Since the research question at hand asked 
how bank size and/or regulation affected loan losses as part o f an existing model, 
ANCOVA appeared to be the most appropriate tool for this task.24
Wildt and Ahtola (1978, 7-9) stated that among its uses is that of performing a 
type of regression analysis which controls for categorical variables when examining the 
relationship between two or more quantitative variables.
Tests o f ANCOVA Assumptions. When performing exploratory research, 
assumptions made about a population distribution may prove to be erroneous and thus 
cause a selected methodology to be inappropriate for a preselected statistical test. Winer, 
Brown and Michels (1991, 764-5) stated that the assumptions required for ANCOVA to 
produce reliable results are (1) normal distribution of the error term, (2) independent 
distribution of the error term (homoscadasticity), and (3) homogeneity of the within-class 
regression coefficients. The following sections will discuss the tests which determine the 
validity of these assumptions.
Test of Normality. Normality of distribution must be examined to determine the 
appropriate statistical procedure to use for hypothesis testing. A Kolmogorov-Smimov 
(K-S) test on the data was conducted to explore the distribution o f the data. The K-S 
statistic, an output o f the SAS Univariate procedure, is a common measure o f univariate 
normality. The null hypothesis for a normal distribution must be rejected if the p  value for
24ANCOVA is a statistical tool used to examine relationships between at least two quantitative 
variables and at least one qualitative variable.
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this statistic is less than .05. The p  value for the K-S test on the data was .01, which 
indicated a nonnormally distributed sample.
Ranked Transformations. Nonnormally distributed data can lead to incorrect 
conclusions in inferential statistical analyses and may bias the correlation coefficients. 
Conover (1980, 337) suggested the use of rank transformation as one way to correct for 
this defect. To perform this operation, he suggested ranking all the observations from 
smallest to largest and then applying the usual analysis of variance to the ranks. Conover 
and Iman (1981, 124) further contended that this procedure29 yields a distribution free 
procedure that "results in a class of nonparametric methods that includes the Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, the Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the Friedman 
test, Spearman's rho, and others."
Conover (1980, 337) suggested that the use of rank transformations could 
mitigate the damage caused by the nonnormality. He stated that "in experimental designs 
for which no nonparametric test exists. . .  to use the usual analysis o f variance on the data 
and then to use the same procedure on the rank transformed data." He further contended 
that "when the two procedures give substantially different results, the analysis on ranks is 
probably more accurate than the analysis on the data and should be preferred.”
"The SAS/STAT User's Guide (1989, 27) concurred with this approach stating that "most 
nonparametric methods are based on taking the ranks and analyzing these ranks (or transformations of 
them) instead of the original values."
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Comparisons o f the two procedures yielded a relatively large difference between
the ranked and unranked data with several variables changing significance.26 (See
Appendices II and III.) Therefore, the rank transformation o f the data was considered
preferable. Conover (1980, 337) stated that it yields:
A procedure that is only conditionally distribution free. . .  it is robust, which means 
that the true level o f significance is usually fairly close to the approximate level o f 
significance used in the test, no matter what the underlying population distribution 
might be.
Test for Homoscedasticitv. The second assumption usually required for ANCOVA 
is independent distribution o f the error term (homoscedasticity). A test for this condition 
was performed using Proc Reg with the Spec option. Results o f this test indicated that the 
sample had heteroscedastic tendencies.
Test for Homogeneity of Internal Repressions. The third assumption commonly
attributed to ANCOVA is homogeneity of internal regressions, which requires the
regression coefficients to be constant between the different classes. Winer, Brown, and
Michels (1991, 765) related that:
With regard to the homogeneity of the within-class regression coefficients, if 
assignment o f units to treatments is random and the treatments do not affect the 
covariate, one expects that assumption to be met. If  intact groups are assigned to 
the treatments, there may possibly be heterogenetity o f internal regression.
“In following Conover’s method, the data were ranked smallest to largest using SAS Proc Rank. 
This procedure was followed by ANCOVA, as utilized by SAS Proc GLM.
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In the present study, the treatments were the class variables of size and regulation. Since 
the effect of treatments on covariates could not be ruled out, the assumption of 
homogeneity of internal regressions could not be met.
Littell, Freund, and Spector (1991, 243) stated that a lack of homogeneity 
"reflect[s] an interaction between the treatment groups and the independent variables or 
covariates." This interaction causes the intersection of the internal regression lines. The 
effect of this intersection results in the decomposition of the ANCOVA model.
Several methods have been utilized by different researchers to examine this 
interaction effect. The methodology selected to test for the presence o f heterogeneity 
followed the suggestion of Littell, Freund, and Spector (1991) to regress loan losses on 
interactions of covariate and class variables as additions to the regression equation. If 
these interaction terms are determined to be statistically significant, then the slopes o f the 
internal regression lines for the class variable and the covariate have different values which 
cause the lines to intersect.
The data were tested for homogeneity of internal regressions by constructing 
interaction terms for all potential class-covariate combinations. These combinations were 
then inserted into the regression of loan losses on the bank size, regulation, and the 14 
covariate variables. The results of that investigation are illustrated in Table I for regulation 
effects and in Table II for bank size effects.
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REGULATION AND COVARIATE INTERACTION
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Parameter F value P R >  F
Regulation*Construction Loans 1.18 0.2764
Regulation*Real Estate Loans 0.44 0.5093
Regulation*Consumer Loans 1.07 0.3007
Regulation*Agriculture Loans 11.20 0.0008
Regulation*Previous Loss Experience 10.41 0.0013
Regulation*Problem Loans 0.07 0.7896
Regulation*Economic Conditions 0.55 0.4597
Regulation*Management Quality 8.57 0.0034
Regulation*Trend Variable 0.73 0.3921
Regulation*Changes in:
Construction Loans 4.48 0.0343
Real Estate Loans 1.52 0.2177
Delinquent Loans 1.40 0.2375
Agriculture Loans 0.83 0.3632
Consumer Loans 2.71 0.0999
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BANK SIZE AND COVARIATE INTERACTION
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Param eter F Value P R >  F
Bank Size*Construction Loans 0.23 0.6345
Bank Size*Real Estate Loans 0.31 0.5791
Bank Size*Consumer Loans 1.57 0.2096
Bank Size* Agriculture Loans 2.51 0.1133
Bank Size*Previous Loss Experience 1.60 0.2060
Bank Size*Problem Loans 0.14 0.7107
Bank Size*Economic Conditions 0.09 0.7640
Bank Size*Management Quality 1.45 0.2290
Bank Size*Trend Variable 0.00 0.9840
Bank Size*Changes in:
Construction Loans 1.58 0.2085
Real Estate Loans 0.00 0.9894
Delinquent Loans 0.24 0.6244
Agriculture Loans 0.39 0.5313
Consumer Loans 0.14 0.7062
An examination of Table I reveals four variables that indicate a statistical 
relationship with regulation. The first variable that illustrates significance is the 
intersection of regulation and agriculture loans. Moore (1992) reported that agricultural 
loans helped explain loan losses in small banks. During the period o f his study, he reported 
"agricultural stress was at its worst in 1986" (119). The perception is that agricultural 
loans were recognized as being impaired by the auditors) and written down accordingly.
The second statistically significant variable is the intersection o f regulation and 
previous loss experience. Since auditors decide when banks will write off bad loans, the 
perception is that the timing o f the loan write-off is associated with audit regulation.
The third variable of significance is the intersection of regulation and management 
quality. A significant part of an audit requires the auditor to evaluate personnel as part of
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the internal control study. A possible explanation for the relationship between 
management quality and regulation might be that audited banks have higher quality 
personnel as a result of the audit.
The final significant variable is the intersection o f regulation and changes in 
construction loans. During the period of study, 1991-1993, the US economy was in a deep 
recession. New construction loans were not being made and defaults on existing loans 
were common. A possible explanation for this relationship between changes in 
construction loans and regulation requiring audits is that the audits forced the recognition 
of the impairment of the construction loan.
Do these four heterogenous variables out of 28 prevent the usage of ANCOVA
because of the presence of heterogeneity of variance? Joyce Lee Shields (1973,29) stated:
Results indicated that ANCOVA is robust to violations o f assumptions of 
homoscedasticity and homogeneity of variance, both singly and in combination, 
when group sizes were equal.
Since the study was designed for a two by two block matrix with equal numbers o f banks
in each cell, the perception is that ANCOVA is robust to the slight appearance of
heterogeneity o f variance and heteroscedasticity.
In the next section, the statistical procedures will be introduced. This area will 
include the sample selection and time frame for the experiment, as well as sample size 
determination.
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Applications o f ANCOVA
ANCOVA has not been applied significantly in accounting research. Most 
applications have been used in marketing and managerial topics. McElroy, Morrow, 
Power, and Iqbal (1993,374-7) applied ANCOVA to measuring the effect of commitment 
on insurance agents’ perceptions, attitudes, and performance. Schnake, Cochran, and 
Dumler (1995,215-7) used ANCOVA to measure organizational citizenship as a measure 
of job satisfaction. Brill (1994, 218) increased the statistical precision in measuring 
managerial opportunism.
Statistical Procedures
ANCOVA was performed upon selected sample banks to test the hypotheses 
concerning the determinants of loan losses in national banks. To allow multiple 
comparisons to be made, both within and between groups, the sample observations were 
selected randomly from each 10th percentile o f the population by total asset size.
As the nonparametric procedure is asymptotic and requires large samples (i.e., >30 
observations) to have reliable results, 60 observations from each o f the subpopulation 
groups were selected randomly. One observation from each group had to be omitted due 
to changes in bank holding company affiliation that occurred during the study period. 
Previous researchers have used similar size samples.27 This sample size also correlates 
with the central limit theorum. Cangelosi, Taylor and Rice (1983, 133-7) cited this
"Examples of sample size of previous research: Dhanani (1986) 22 banks, Altman (1968) 33 
firms, Meyer and Pifer (1970) 30 banks, Baldwin and Glezen (1992) 40 firms, Yue (1992) 60 banks, 
Espahbodi (1991) 48 banks, and Wojnilower (1962) 60 banks.
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theorum as stating that as a sample size approaches 30 observations, the distribution tends 
to become normally distributed.
For each o f the 59 remaining banks from each group, observations were collected 
in quarterly increments for the variables discussed in the previous section for a period of 
three years between 1991 and 1993. Austin (1992,38) reported that the normal operating 
cycle o f a bank (issuance of loan to collection) is five years. The use of this ideal period 
was precluded because of the growth in bank size that resulted in too many banks 
changing size category over this number o f years. Three years was determined to be the 
most practical period of time that could be utilized and still illustrate the problem.
Chapter m  has presented the methodology used in the empirical analysis of 
determinants ofbank loan losses. The variables defined by the AICPA as determining loan 
losses were enumerated as were two suggested additions: regulation and bank size. 
Hypotheses to be tested were presented. The population was defined as being small and 
medium size national banks held by large and small holding companies. Selection of the 
sample and collection of data were also discussed. Statistical procedures used for testing 
the distribution of the data were delininated. Analysis o f covariance was selected as the 
statistical tool to perform hypotheses tests. The results o f these hypotheses tests are 
presented in Chapter IV.
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RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results o f the empirical analyses o f the 
study on determinants of loan losses in national banks. Results are divided into five major 
sections. Section one relates the findings of tests for interactive effects between regulation 
and size. Main effects of size and regulation cannot be determined until the presence or 
absence of interaction is determined.
The next section discloses the effects o f bank regulation on loan losses, as 
measured by the requirement to be audited annually. Section three relates the statistical 
relationship of loan losses and bank size, which consists of small and medium national 
banks.
The fourth section consists of an examination into the economy o f scale 
controversy in banking. As a summation, section five illustrates the association o f loan 
losses and the covariates suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee.
Need for Additional Guidance Concerning 
Regulation and Size
This section presents the results of tests performed to determine whether loan 
losses are affected by bank regulation requiring financial audits and by size as measured
68
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by total assets o f national banks. Do size and regulation interact to affect loan losses in 
national banks? No previous research has been found that addressed this question. In 
conjunction with guidance for size and regulation main effects, guidance for interaction 
between these two areas needs to be addressed as well. The presence or absence of an 
interactive effect (see the Covariance Model on page 58) needs to be determined prior to 
testing for main effects.
To determine whether interaction o f size and regulation occurs, 59 small LHC 
member banks were contrasted with 59 medium SHC member banks. In addition, 59 small 
SHC member banks were contrasted with 59 medium LHC member banks.
ANCOVA was performed on these comparisons to determine whether a 
statistically significant relationship existed between loan losses and the interaction of 
regulation and size for these two groups. The results of this analysis are shown in Table
m.
T A B L E m  
TEST FOR INTERACTION BETWEEN 
SIZE AND REGULATION
Param eter F Value P R >  F
Bank Size*Regulation 0.27 0.6026
Based upon this statistical analysis, the results fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
no statistical differences between group means. Therefore, the null hypothesis for 
interaction of size and regulation is accepted as follows:
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7Ho: Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to
differentiate small LHC and medium SHC member banks.
8Ho: Audit regulation and size do not interact as part o f the AICPA model to
differentiate small SHC and medium LHC member banks.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Regulation
One area neglected by the AICPA has been the impact o f regulation on bank
determination of the ALL. In the current study, loan losses o f national banks were
examined to determine whether the loan loss recognition was affected by the external audit
function, a type o f  bank regulation.
Fifty-nine small LHC member banks required by regulation to have annual
independent audits were compared to 59 small SHC member banks that had no such
regulation. The results of that comparison of least square loan losses are shown in Table
TV.
TABLE IV 
LOAN LOSSES IN SMALL SIZE BANKS 
DUE TO REGULATION
LS Means Std. Err.
Param eter Loan Losses Loan Losses
Small SHC Member Banks 1320.55234 28.88244
Small LHC Member Banks 1327.75368 28.93058
Fifty-nine medium LHC member banks required by regulation to submit to annual 
independent audits were compared to 59 medium SHC member banks that had no such
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regulation. The results of that comparison of least square loan losses are shown in Table 
V.
TABLE V
LOAN LOSSES IN MEDIUM SIZE BANKS 
DUE TO REGULATION
LS Means Std. Err.
Parameter Loan Losses Loan Losses
Medium SHC Member Banks 1491.50110 28.47070
Medium LHC Member Banks 1527.60185 28.36672
ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine whether a statistically 
significant relationship existed between loan losses, previously defined in the study as net 
charge-offs, and the two classes o f national banks. The results of that analysis are shown 
in Table VI.
TABLE VI
PERCEPTION OF A NEED CONCERNING REGULATION 
AS PART OF AICPA MODEL
Parameter F Value P R >  F
Regulation 0.58 0.4458
Tables IV and V indicate differences in least square means between the two classes 
of banks exists. Table VI, however, clearly indicates that these differences are not 
statistically significant.
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Based upon this statistical analysis, the results fail to reject the null hypotheses of 
no statistical differences between group means. Therefore, the null hypotheses for both 
small and medium banks are accepted as follows:
SHo: Audit regulation as part of the AICPA model does not help differentiate small LHC 
and small SHC member banks.
6Ho: Audit regulation as part o f the AICPA model does not help differentiate medium 
LHC and medium SHC member banks.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Size
An additional area left unexplored by the AICPA is the effect of bank size on loan 
losses. Previous studies have debated the existence of an economy o f scale in banking. 
One purpose of this research was to determine whether size should be considered when 
auditing banks. To achieve that purpose, an "F" test was administered to the data. The 
holding company effect was held constant by comparisons within holding company size.
Fifty-nine small LHC member banks were compared to 59 medium LHC member 
banks. Results of the comparison of least square mean loan losses are exhibited in Table
vn.
TABLE VTI 
LOAN LOSSES FOR SMALL & MEDIUM 
LHC MEMBER BANKS
Parameter LS Means Std. Err.
Loan Losses Loan Losses
Small LHC Member Banks 1327.75368 28.93058
Medium LHC Member Banks 1527.60185 28.36672
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Fifty-nine small SHC member banks also were compared to 59 medium SHC 
member banks. Results of the comparison of least square mean loan losses are exhibited 
in Table VIII.
TABLE V m  
LOAN LOSSES FOR SMALL & MEDIUM  
SHC MEMBER BANKS
LS Means Std. Err.
Parameter Loan Losses Loan Losses
Small SHC Member Banks 1320.55234 28.88244
Medium SHC Member Banks 1491.50110 28.47070
ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine whether a statistically 
significant relationship existed between loan losses and the two sizes o f national banks. 
The results o f the statistical analysis are shown on Table IX.
TABLE IX
PERCEPTION OF A NEED CONCERNING 
SIZE AS PART OF AICPA MODEL
Parameter F Value PR > F
Size 37.12 0.0001
Tables VII and VTII indicate differences in group means between the two sizes of 
banks exists. Table IX demonstrates the statistical significance of this difference.
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As a result of this statistical analysis, the null hypotheses o f no effect must be 
rejected. The resulting alternative hypotheses for small and medium banks are accepted 
as follows:
lHa: Bank size as part of the AICPA model differentiates small and medium LHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.
2Ha: Bank size as part o f the AICPA model differentiates small and medium SHC
member banks as to loan loss determination.
Need for Additional Guidance 
Concerning Scale
The inconsistent results from numerous research projects for determination of 
economy of scale in banking calls for additional guidance for this issue. Does increased 
size lead to efficiencies in loan departments that allow them to decrease the bank loan 
losses? The advent of the new information age o f computers suggests that loan officers 
should have more and better information on customers. In theory, better lending decisions 
should be made that would decrease loan losses and create an economy of scale.
To determine whether an economy or a diseconomy of scale exists, a two-tailed 
T test was performed on the data. Holding company size was held constant to prevent 
confounding the decision. The results of that test for small holding companies may be seen 
in Table X.
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TABLEX
ECONOMY OF SCALE HYPOTHESES: 
WITHIN SHC’S
LS Means S t d .  E r r . P r  > T
Parameter Loan Losses Loan Losses
Small SHC Member Banks 1320.55234 28.88244
Medium SHC Member Banks 1491.50110 28.47070 .0001
From this test, the null hypothesis (4Ho) must be rejected. In addition, the first
alternative hypothesis (4Hal) o f larger loan losses for small banks must be rejected.
Therefore, the results are a failure to reject hypothesis (4Ha2) that loan losses are smaller
in small SHC banks. The alternative hypothesis is accepted as follows:
4Ha2: Loan losses are less in small SHC member banks than in medium SHC member 
banks.
Economy of Scale Hypotheses Within 
LHC’S
An examination was also made into LHC banks to determine whether an economy 
or diseconomy of scale exists between small and medium banks in the large holding 
company environment. The results of that exam are exhibited in Table XI.
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TABLE XI 
ECONOMY OF SCALE HYPOTHESES: 
W ITHIN LHC’*
Parameter LS M eans Std.Err.
Parameter Loan Losses Loan Losses PR>T
Small LHC Member Banks 1327.75368 28.93058
Medium LHC Member Banks 1527.60185 28.36672 .0001
From this test, both the null hypothesis (3Ho) and the first alternative hypothesis 
(3Hal) o f larger loan losses for small banks must be refuted. Therefore, the results are a 
failure to reject hypothesis (3Ha2) that loan losses are less in small SHC banks. This 
alternative hypothesis is accepted as follows:
3Ha2: Loan losses are less in small LHC member banks than in medium LHC member 
banks.
Need for Additional Guidance Concerning 
the AICPA Model Variables
The AICPA has advanced a prescriptive model for auditors to follow when
examining the allowance for loan losses o f  banks. Since this model has not been
empirically tested, the statistical significance o f the suggested variables have not been
examined. In the current study, loan losses o f national banks are examined to determine
whether this prescriptive model can aid in differentiating between small and medium
national banks, as well as between those banks required by regulation to be audited and
those that are not.
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Fifty-nine national banks from each o f the four categories were compared to 
determine whether size, regulation, and the AICPA variables, used as covariates, could 
differentiate loan losses. ANCOVA was performed on the ranked data to determine 
whether a statistically significant relationship existed between loan losses and the covariate 
variables. The results of this analysis are shown in Table XII.
TABLE XH 
AICPA MODEL USED AS COVARIATES
Parameter F Value PR < F
Construction Loans 1.01 0.3142
Real Estate Loans 0.00 0.9825
Consumer Loans 5.38 0.0204
Agricultural Loans 2.97 0.0849
Previous Loss Experience 5.98 0.0145
Problem Loans 42.82 0.0001
Economic Conditions 1.52 0.2184
Management Quality 54.55 0.0001
Trend Variable 253.71 0.0001
Changes in:
Construction Loans 7.39 0.0066
Real Estate Loans 0.82 0.3652
Consumer Loans 7.29 0.0070
Agricultural Loans 0.29 0.5911
Delinquent Loans 24.03 0.0001
The results are that o f the 14 covariates used in the model, only eight demonstrate 
statistical significance. Of these, seven were suggested by the AICPA Banking 
Committee. Consumer loans, previous loss experience, problem loans, management 
quality, and changes in construction loans, consumer loans, and delinquent loans all
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demonstrated statistically significance at the .05 level. In addition, the trend variable also 
demonstrated a strong statistical significance.
In contrast, six other variables suggested by the Committee did not illustrate 
significance. Those variables not exhibiting significance were agricultural loans, 
construction loans, real estate loans, economic conditions, and changes in agricultural 
loans and real estate loans.
Another area of interest was the amount o f the variance of loan losses explained 
by the AICPA model. When the thirteen model variables were regressed on loan losses, 
13.8 percent of the variability was explained. All the variables but construction loans and 
changes in construction, real estate, and agricultural loans exhibited significance.
When the trend variable was introduced, the coefficient of one o f the variables 
changed sign. This change usually indicates a mild case o f multicollinearity.
By adding regulation and size to the model, the amount of explained variance was 
increased by 10 percent more than that explained by the AICPA model alone. Since trend 
variables cannot "explain" variance, the trend variable was not included in this calculation.
This chapter has presented the findings of this study. The following chapter, 
Chapter V, provides a summary o f the study, conclusions drawn from the findings, and 
implications for future research.
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SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Recently, a significant number of banks have become insolvent. A major 
contributor to this trend has been the inability of the banks to collect outstanding loans. 
Frequently, external auditors of these failed institutions have been sued by investors and 
creditors. A major accusation o f these litigations has been that auditors incorrectly 
determined the net realizable value of the loan portfolio. The major factor involved in this 
determination is the Allowance for Loan Losses (ALL).
Regulators from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and members of the 
Banking Committee from the AICPA have exhibited a keen interest in how the ALL is 
measured. Factors that influence loan losses, both internal and external, have been 
examined for possible significance. Models involving these factors have been suggested 
as areas of interest for auditors.
Statement of the Problem
In the auditing profession, performance of the audit must be performed both 
efficiently and effectively. If not efficient, the audit will come in "over budget" causing 
reduced net income to the audit firm and the potential for other difficulties. If not
79
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effective, the audit can result in litigation for the audit firm, especially if the client becomes 
insolvent.
While bank regulators have mandated that an adequate ALL be established, no 
definite method has been identified as a preferred procedure. In contrast, the AICPA 
Banking Committee (1986, 13-14) has suggested that certain factors should be examined 
when auditing the ALL. To date, no research has been found that tested these factors in 
a composite model to determine their reliability in explaining loan losses.
Other factors suggested by the AICPA Audit Committee (1989, 260) as 
prerequisites in studying internal control environments were regulation and size. These 
factors were not included in the normative model for ALL determination by the AICPA 
Banking Committee.
In conjunction with the internal control environment, size has also been featured 
in numerous studies in attempts to determine the existence o f an economy of scale in the 
banking environment. No previous research has been found that attempted to determine 
an economy of scale by contrasting asset size with loan losses.
The primary purpose of this study was to determine whether size and regulation 
help explain loan losses in addition to the factors suggested by the AICPA Banking 
Committee. A second purpose was to determine if loan losses could be used to determine 
if an economy of scale is present in banking. Finally, the factors suggested by the Banking 
Committee were assessed for statistical significance to determine which factors, if any, 
contribute to loan loss determination.
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Summary of Methodology 
Financial and economic data for 236 national banks for the years 1991-1993 
comprised the primary data for this study. Data for 13 variables suggested by the AICPA 
Banking Committee were collected from SheshunofF s Information Service: The Bank 
Quarterly: Ratings and Analysis and from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics database: 
LAB ST AT. as well as two variables suggested by the AICPA Professional Standards and 
one statistical variable.
Tests for normality o f distribution were performed to determine the most 
appropriate statistical procedure to utilize in analyzing the data. Alter discovering that the 
data were not normally distributed, rank transformation o f the data was performed as 
suggested by Conover (1980, 337). The transformed data was then examined for 
heterogeneity o f slopes to determine whether analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA) could be 
used to examine statistically the data. Only four of the variables were found to have non­
parallel slopes. The small number of heterogeneous slopes and the large data set (2832 
observations) were influential factors, along with the robustness o f the ANCOVA model 
as reported by Shields (1973, 28), in determining the appropriateness o f ANCOVA for 
statistical analysis of the data.
ANCOVA was utilized to test for statistical relationships between size, regulation, 
AICPA variables, and loan losses. Four subsamples o f national banks were examined. 
One group was composed o f  banks that were affiliated with large holding companies. The 
second group of banks were affiliated with small holding companies. Each o f these two
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groups was subdivided into equal numbers o f  medium and small banks. Results of these 
comparisons are summarized in the following section.
Summary o f  Findings 
A summation of the findings of this study on loan losses in national banks is 
discussed in the order of presentation utilized in Chapter IV. First, findings regarding 
possible interaction between regulation requiring annual audits and banks size are 
discussed as to the effect on loan losses. Second, the results of an examination into 
whether regulation requiring an independent audit affects loan losses follows. This 
examination is succeeded by a discussion o f whether bank size determines loan losses. 
Next, an examination into whether loan losses can determine the existence of an economy 
of scale in banking. The summary concludes with an inspection of the possible association 
of loan losses and the covariates suggested by the AICPA is inspected.
The findings of this study indicate that the interaction of regulation and size does 
not statistically affect loan losses in national banks. The lack of an interaction allows the 
further study o f whether the main effects of size and regulation are statistically significant. 
Had the interaction been significant, only simple effects could have been explored.
Findings are that regulation of national banks requiring an annual audit by a CPA 
is not statistically significant. The association o f regulation and loan losses exhibits a low 
level of correlation at the .05 level of significance.
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This study found that bank size as measured by total assets is a significant 
determinant of loan losses in national banks. Size added 10 percent more to the explained 
variability when added to the AICPA model.
Previous studies had disagreed about the existence of an economy of scale in 
banking. This finding appears to support those who argue against an economy o f scale.
In a comparison o f small to medium LHC member banks, medium banks were 
found to have significantly larger loan losses. Larger loan losses in medium banks were 
also found when contrasting small to medium SHC member banks.
Findings are that eight out of 14 covariate variables exhibited statistical significance 
at a .05 alpha level. Variables exhibiting statistical significance in determining bank loan 
losses are (1) the trend variable, (2) management quality, (3) problem loans, (4) changes 
in delinquent loans, (5) changes in consumer loans, (6) changes in construction loans, 
(7) previous loss experience, and (8) consumer loans.
In addition, Beta Weights were calculated for the eight predictor variables and the 
trend variable. Hatcher and Stepanski (1994,431) stated "Beta Weights are the regression 
coefficient that would be obtained if all the variables were standardized, so that they had 
the same standard deviations." As illustrated in Table XIII, the trend variable has the 
largest Beta Weight coefficient, followed closely by management quality and problem 
loans. Bank size and changes in delinquent loans also contribute significant amounts to 
the model. Changes in consumer loans and construction loans, previous loss experience 
and consumer loans make equal marginal contributions to the explanation of loan losses.
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TABLE X m  
COMPOSITE MODEL
Param eter F Value P R >  F Beta Weights*
1. Trend Variable 261.36 0.0001 .287
2. Management Quality 75.94 0.0001 -.188
3. Problem Loans 41.46 0.0001 .145
4. Size 43.91 0.0001 .119
Changes in:
5. Delinquent Loans 24.09 0.0001 -.085
6. Consumer Loans 7.65 0.0057 .047
7. Construction Loans 6.92 0.0086 -.044
8. Previous Loss Experience
9. Consumer Loans
5.74
5.54
0.0166
0.0187
.043
.041
*Beta Weights are standardized multiple regression coefficients obtained when 
loan losses were regressed on the eight predictor variables and the trend variable.
The findings further indicated that construction loans, real estate loans, agricultural 
loans, economic conditions, and changes in real estate loans and agricultural loans were 
not statistically significant in explaining bank loans.
Conclusions
The research questions formulated at the inception of the study serve as the basis for 
the derivation of the conclusions. The five questions that follow will be examined in 
separate paragraphs.
1. Does regulation affect loan loss recognition in national banks?
This question was addressed by determining if a difference existed in loan losses 
between small SHC member banks and small LHC banks. Also addressed was the
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determination o f a difference between medium SHC member banks and medium LHC 
member banks. ANCOVA indicated no difference between either set of banks. Thus, it 
was concluded that regulation which required an annual audit does not result in a 
difference in loan losses between either sets of banks.
A possible explanation of this result is that banks may have begun to substitute 
audit fees for examiner fees. This area invites further investigation into this phenomena.
2. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within LHC's due to 
bank size?
This question was addressed by determining whether a difference existed between 
small and medium LHC member banks. ANCOVA illustrated a large statistical difference 
between the means o f the two different size LHC member banks. Thus, the conclusion is 
that asset size does serve to explain loan losses in LHC member banks.
Demsetz and Strahan (1995, 15-18) suggested that large companies have greater 
leverage and are engaging in riskier activities. This explanation might explain the greater 
losses incurred by medium banks as compared to small banks. As the medium banks seek 
riskier returns, they incur increased loan losses as well.
3. Is there a difference in loan loss recognition by national banks within SHCs due to 
bank size?
This question was addressed by an examination to determine if a difference exists in 
loan loss recognition between small and medium SHC member banks. The results from 
the use of ANCOVA illustrate that a  statistical difference was discovered between small 
and medium SHC banks. A conclusion was determined from this finding that size does 
serve to explain loan losses in SHC member banks.
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From these conclusions, size appears to be a variable that an auditor would use if 
he was constructing a predictive model for loan loss determination A definite appearance 
of necessity is indicated for an aggregate model variable.
4. Do size and regulation interact in the determination o f loan losses in national banks? 
This question was addressed by an investigation to determine if a difference in loan
loss recognition exists between small LHC member banks and medium SHC member 
banks, as well as between small SHC member banks and medium LHC member banks. 
Interactions are dependent upon the statistical significance o f main effects. The results 
from ANCOVA illustrated the lack of significance of both regulation and the 
size/regulation interaction. Therefore, the conclusion is that asset size and audit regulation 
do not interact to affect loan losses in national banks.
5. Do the variables suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee explain loan losses in 
national banks?
To address this question, ANCOVA was used to determine which of the variables 
exhibited statistical significance. The findings indicated that seven of the thirteen variables 
suggested by the AICPA Banking Committee were statistically significant in the 
determination of loan losses. The conclusion was that consumer loans, previous loss 
experience, problem loans, management quality, and changes in construction loans, 
consumer loans and delinquent loans were useful in explaining loan losses in national 
banks.
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Also, the significance of the trend variable indicated that unknown relevant 
variables were omitted from the study. Determination of these variables was not feasible 
from this research.
It was not possible to determine any positive conclusions from the selected sample 
concerning the relationships, if any, between loan losses and construction loans, real estate 
loans, agricultural loans, economic conditions, or changes in real estate loans and 
agricultural loans.
Implications for Further Research
Hendriksen (1982,10-14) states that "normative theories attempt to prescribe what 
data ought to be communicated and how they ought to be presented; that is they attempt 
to explain what should be rather than what is" (Hendriksen’s emphasis). He furthers this 
argument by stating that they "are always difficult to evaluate and must always be subject 
to change as new information is obtained." In the audit guide for determining the 
allowance for loan losses, the AICPA described a normative model to be followed by bank 
auditors. This study was an attempt to test and possibly explain this model.
Both audit practitioners and academics may benefit from the findings of this study. 
The efficiency and effectiveness of audits can be improved by auditors who utilize the 
results. In addition, theorists could advance accounting theory by adjusting earlier 
normative theory.
Because of the exploratory nature of this research, several areas were examined. 
Each area could have expanded investigations conducted upon it. One example is that of
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asset size effect on loan losses. Many questions concerning size remain unresolved by this 
study, such as the following:
1. Are large banks more efficient at making and collecting loans than small and medium 
banks?
2. Do large banks employ better management than do medium or small banks?
3. Does the asset size of a bank influence the portfolio selection?
Answers to these questions will come from future research conducted by those 
directly affected. Certainly, the Banking Committee o f the AICPA, as well as the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, should have an interest in these areas.
Another area worthy of future research involves the methodology used in this 
study. Analysis of covariance has seen little use by either academics or practitioners. The 
additional precision gained by using ANCOVA could give added benefits to studies 
conducted using simple analysis of variance.
A final suggestion for future research is the consideration of size and efficiency on 
acquired banks. With the explosion of bank acquisitions and mergers that have occurred 
recently, a relevant research area to be explored would be the effect on efficiency of 
acquired banks as compared to pre-acquisition banks.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDICES
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX I
STANDARD MEASURES OF CENTRAL TENDENCY 
AND DISPERSION
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Small SHC Member Banks
91
VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Loan Losses1 0.24 0.44 -0.39 3.65
Composition of 
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans 4.12 6.30 0.00 51.00
Real Estate Loans 11.30 7.36 0.00 43.00
Consumer Loans 26.34 12.55 1.00 65.00
Agriculture Loans 2.35 5.43 0.00 43.00
Trends in Loan Volume 
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans 1.40 35.20 -100.00 100.00
Real Estate Loans 2.26 19.64 -86.70 100.00
Consumer Loans 0.11 11.69 -75.00 71.40
Agriculture Loans 0.59 22.32 -100.00 100.00
Delinquent Loans4 0.51 49.54 -100.00 100.00
Other Factors
Problem Loans5 1.29 1.66 0.00 11.97
Econ. Conditions5 7.23 2.72 2.60 22.20
Mgt. Quality7 36.46 25.76 0.00 98.00
Previous Loss & 
Recovery* 0.25 0.44 -0.39 3.65
Trend Variable 342.00 111.89 191.00 493.00
‘measured as a percentage of average loans
Measured as a percentage of total assets
3measured as the change in percentage of total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
5measured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage of gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a Sheshunoff statistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Loan Losses1 0.31 0.50 -0.58 3.92
Composition of 
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans 2.70 4.13 0.00 27.00
Real Estate Loans 12.94 6.51 1.00 38.00
Consumer Loans 31.05 12.57 3.00 62.00
Agriculture 1.40 2.87 0.00 20.00
Trends in Loan Volume 
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans -1.90 33.02 -100.00 100.00
Real Estate Loans 1.88 15.32 -83.30 88.90
Consumer Loans -0.29 10.87 -91.20 90.90
Agriculture Loans -0.12 20.55 -100.00 100.00
Delinquent Loans4 0.99 39.46 -100.00 100.00
Other Factors
Problem Loans5 1.43 1.86 0.00 14.86
Econ. Conditions® 7.37 2.83 2.20 27.80
Mgt. Quality7 45.54 32.29 0.00 98.00
Previous Loss & 
Recovery* 0.31 0.50 -0.58 3.92
Trend 342.00 111.89 191.00 493.00
Measured as a percentage o f average loans
2measured as a percentage o f total assets
3measured as the change in percentage o f total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage of gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
7measured by President’s weighting: a SheshunofFstatistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Loan Losses1 0.22 0.56 -1.14 5.09
Composition of 
Loan Portfolio2:
Construction Loans 1.42 2.03 0.00 12.00
Real Estate Loans 8.03 6.02 0.00 41.00
Consumer Loans 28.38 14.41 5.00 65.00
Agriculture Loans 5.38 7.07 0.00 29.00
Trends in Loan Volume 
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans -0.33 35.90 -100.00 100.00
Real Estate Loans 0.88 17.99 -64.70 100.00
Consumer Loans 0.11 9.70 -50.00 59.30
Agriculture Loans 1.20 20.29 -100.00 100.00
Delinquent Loans4 -2.33 7.20 -100.00 100.00
Other Factors
Problem Loans5 0.94 1.85 0.00 20.68
Econ. Conditions 6.92 2.92 1.60 19.20
Mgt. Quality 54.48 23.81 2.00 98.00
Previous Loss & 
Recovery8 0.22 0.56 -1.14 5.09
Trend 342.00 111.89 191.00 493.00
‘measured as a percentage o f average loans
Measured as a percentage o f total assets
3measured as the change in percentage of total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage of gross loans
^measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a SheshunofFstatistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage of average assets lagged one
quarter
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VARIABLE MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM
Loan Losses1 0.30 0.46 -0.63 3.81
Composition of 
Loan Portfolio2
Construction Loans 1.67 1.93 0.00 13.00
Real Estate Loans 9.71 5.36 1.00 40.00
Consumer Loans 34.12 13.57 7.00 68.00
Agriculture Loans 2.04 3.87 0.00 22.00
Trends in Loan Volume 
& Delinquencies3
Construction Loans 0.12 34.64 -100.00 100.00
Real Estate Loans 0.97 16.79 -91.20 100.00
Consumer Loans 0.58 8.01 -72.20 40.00
Agriculture Loans -0.22 15.78 -100.00 100.00
Delinquent Loans4 -2.00 39.30 -100.00 100.00
Other Factors
Problem Loans5 1.07 1.05 0.00 6.64
Econ. Conditions 6.99 2.29 1.90 17.30
Mgt. Quality 52.53 25.71 2.00 98.00
Previous Loss & 
Recovery8 0.30 0.46 -0.63 3.81
Trend 342.00 111.89 191.00 493.00
‘measured as a percentage of average assets
Measured as a percentage of total assets
3measured as the change in percentage of total assets
4measured as the change in percentage of nonaccrual loans vs gross loans
Smeasured as the nonaccrual loans as a percentage o f gross loans
6measured as the change in county/parish unemployment rates
’measured by President’s weighting: a Sheshunoff statistic
'measured by quarterly loan losses as a percentage o f average assets lagged one
quarter
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SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE FVALUE PR > F
MODEL 16 410158918.2 25634932.4 48.73 0.0001
ERROR 2814 480248023.7 526029.9
CORRECTED 2830 1890406941.9
TOTAL
R-SQUARE C.V. ROOT MSE LOAN LOSS MEAN
0.216969 51.18824 725.2792 1416.886
SOURCE DF TYPE HISS MEAN SQUARE FVALUE PR > F
REGULATION & SIZE EFFECTS:
Regulation I 305869.7 305869.7 0.58 0.4458
Size I 19525783.1 19525783.1 37.12 0.0001
COMPOSITION OF LOAN PORTFOLIO:
Construction 1 532968.5 532968.5 1.01 0.3142
Real Estate I 253.7 253.7 0.00 0.9825
Consumer 1 2830072.3 2830072.3 5.38 0.0204
Agriculture 1 1562857.9 1562857.9 2.97 0.0849
TRENDS (CHANGES! IN LOAN VOLUME AND DELINQUENCIES:
Construction 1 3887077.1 3887077.1 7.39 0.0066
Real Estate 1 431372.8 431372.8 0.82 0.3652
Consumer 1 3837116.2 3837116.2 7.29 0.0070
Agriculture 1 151830.2 151830.2 0.29 0.5911
Delinquent 1 12638677.0 12638677.0 24.03 0.0001
POTENTIAL PROBLEM LOANS AND RESULTS OF REGULATORY EXAMS:
Prob. Loans 1 22524527.0 22524527.0 42.82 0.0001
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
Local 1 797248.2 797248.2 1.52 0.2184
Unemployment
EXPERIENCE. COMPETENCE & DEPTH OF MANAGEMENT:
Management 1 28697204.0 28697204.0 54.55 0.0001
PREVIOUS LOSS & RECOVERY EXPERIENCE:
Previous Loss
Experience 1 3144411.7 3144411.7 5.98 0.0145
TREND: 1 133459888.0 133459888.0 253.71 0.0001
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Unranked Analysis of Covariance
DEPENDENT VARIABLE; Loan Losses
SUM OF MEAN
SOURCE DF SQUARES SQUARE FVALUE PR> F
MODEL 16 162.9462469 10.1841404 54.49 0.0001
ERROR 2814 525.9443600 0.1869028
CORRECTED 2830 688.8906070
TOTAL
R-SQUARE C.V. ROOT MSE LOAN LOSS MEAN
0.236534 159.7871 0.432323 0.270562
SOURCE DF ty pe  m s s MEAN SQUARE FVALUE PR> F
REGULATION & SIZE EFFECTS:
Regulation 1 1.51066643 1.51066643 8.08 0.0045
Size 1 2.71430099 2.71430099 14.52 0.0001
COMPOSITION OF LOAN PORTFOLIO:
Construction 1 0.30239822 0.30239822 1.62 0.2035
Real Estate 1 0.00141704 0.00141704 0.01 0.9306
Consumer 1 0.01440005 0.01440005 0.08 0.7814
Agriculture 1 0.04753940 0.04753940 0.25 0.6141
TRENDS (CHANGES! IN LOAN VOLUME AND DELINQUENCIES:
Construction 1 0.22375897 0.22375897 1.20 0.2740
Real Estate 1 0.05428249 0.05428249 0.29 0.5900
Consumer 1 0.09541453 0.09541453 0.51 0.4750
Agriculture 1 0.10964568 0.10964568 0.59 0.4438
Delinquent I 3.09312076 3.09312076 16.55 0.0001
POTENTIAL PROBLEM LOANS AND RESULTS OF REGULATORY EXAMS:
Problem I 28.98496170 28.98496170 155.08 0.0001
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:
Local 1 0.00445835 0.00445835 0.02 0.8773
Unemployment
EXPERIENCE. COMPETENCE & DEPTH OF MANAGEMENT:
Management 1 16.46383297 16.46383297 88.09 0.0001
PREVIOUS LOSS & RECOVERY EXPERIENCE:
Previous Loss
Experience 1 6.50163240 6.50163240 34.79 0.0001
Trend 1 37.07139524 37.07139524 198.35 0.0001
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Medium Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 1 o f 2)
CITY  CO U N TY /PA RISH STA TE BANK NAM E
CULLMAN Cullman AL SouthTrust Bank of Cullman, NA
FLORENCE Lauderdale AL FNB of Florence
OPP Covington AL SouthTrustBank of Covington County, NA
ELDORADO Union AR The First National Bank of El Dorado
PHOENIX Maricopa AZ Northern Trust Bank of Arizona, NA
ALAMEDA Alameda CA Alameda FNB
PLEASANTON Alameda CA Community FNB
DENVER Denver CO FNB Southeast Denver
FORT COLLINS Larimer CO 1st Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, NA
WASHINGTON DC DC Citizens Bank of Washington, NA
HOBE SOUND Martin FL Barnett Bank of Martin County, NA
NAPLES Collier FL Sun Bank/Naples, NA
TALLAHASSEE Leon FL Sun Bank/Tallahassee
AUGUSTA Richmond GA Trust Co. Bank of Augusta, NA
BRUNSWICK Glenn GA Barnett Bank of Southeast Georgia, NA
CORNELIA Habersham GA FNB of Habersham
SAVANNAH Chatham GA Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of Savannah, NA
BELLEVILLE S t Clair IL Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville
CHARLESTON Coles IL Boatmen’s National Bank of Charleston
DOWNERS GROVE DuPage IL Citizens National Bank of Downers Grove
MOLINE Rock Island IL First Midwest Bank/Western Illinois, NA
ROCK ISLAND Rock Island IL FIRST OF AMERICA Bank-Quad Cities, NA
EVANSVILLE Vanderburgh IN The National City Bank of Evansville
MARION Grant IN Bank One, Marion, IN, NA
WARSAW Kosciusko IN FNB of Warsaw
LAFAYE'ITE Lafayette LA The FNB of Lafayette
LAKE CHARLES Calcasieu LA The FNB o f Lake Charles
LEONARDTOWN S t Mary's MD The FNB of S t Mary's at Leonard town
FENTON Genesee MI Bank One, Fenton, NA
MARQUETTE Marquette MI 1st of America Bank-Upp. Peninsula, NA
ST. CLOUD Steams MN The First American N. B. o f SL Cloud
CAPE GIRARDEAU Cape Girardeau MO Boatmen's N.B. o f Cape Girardeau
JOPLIN Jasper MO Mercantile Bank of Joplin, NA
JOPLIN Jasper MO Commerce Bank of Joplin, NA
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Medium Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 2 o f 2)
CITY COUNTY/PARISH STATE BANK NAME
BILLINGS Yellowstone MT Norwest Bank Billings, NA
GREAT FALLS Cascade MT Norwest Bank Great Falls, NA
HELENA Lewis & Clark MT Norwest Bank Helena, NA
COLUMBUS Platte NE FNB & TC of Columbus
CLOVIS Curry NM Sun west Bank of Clovis, NA
SANTA FE SanteFe M First Interstate Bank of New Mexico, NA
GLENS FALLS Warren NY Glens Falls National Bank & Trust Co.
CAMBRIDGE Guernsey OH Bank One, Cambridge, NA
FREMONT Sandusky OH Bank One, Fremont, NA
PORTSMOUTH Scioto OH Bank One, Portsmouth, NA
STEUBENVILLE Jefferson OH Bank One, Steubenville, NA
DANVILLE Montour PA The FNB OF Danville
GREENCASTLE Franklin PA Citizens N.B. of Southern Penn.
STATE COLLEGE Centre PA The People's N.B. of Central Penn.
CROSS VILLE Cumberland TN The FNB of Crossville
KNOXVILLE Knox TN National Bank of Commerce (NBC)
SHELBYVILLE Bedford TN FNB of Shelbyville
GALVESTON Galveston TX The U. S. National Bank of Galveston
HOUSTON Harris TX Charter National Bank - Colonial
HOUSTON Harris TX Charter National Bank - Houston
NACOGDOCHES Nacogdoches TX Stone Fort National Bank
SHAWANO Shawano WI Valley Bank of Shawano, NA
BLUEF1ELD Mercer WV The Flat Top National Bank of Bluefield
FAIRMONT Marion WV City National Bank o f Fairmont
CLARKSBURG Harrison WV The Empire National Bank of Clarksburg
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Medium Size SHC Member Banks
(Page 1 of 2)
CITY  CO UNTY /PARISH STATE BANK NAM E
HUNTINGTON BEACH Orange CA Huntington National Bank
LOS ANGELES Los Angeles CA Marathon National Bank
NEWPORT BEACH Orange CA Pacific National Bank
ORANGE Orange CA Orange National Bank
RANCHO CUCAMONGA San Bernardino CA Vineyard National Bank
SACRAMENTO Sacramento CA Sacramento FNB
SAN DIEGO San Diego CA San Diego National Bank
SANTA MONICA Los Angeles CA First Professional Bank NA
VISALIA Tulare CA Mineral King National Bank
NAPLES Collier FL Citizens National Bank o f Naples
DECATUR DeKalb GA Fidelity National Bank
GRIFFIN Spalding GA FNB of Griffin
MOULTRIE Colquitt GA Moultrie National Bank
HONOLULU Honolulu HI Hawaii National Bank
IOWA CITY Johnson IA FNB, Iowa City, Iowa
CHAMPAIGN Champaign IL The Champaign National Bank
GENESEO Henry IL The Farmers National Bank of Geneseo
MOLINE Rock Island IL FNB of Moline
TELL CITY Perry IN The Citizens National Bank of Tell City
VINCENNES Knox IN The American National Bank of Vincennes
GRETNA Jefferson LA FNB of Jefferson Parish
HOUMA Terrebonne LA FNB of Houma
OAKLAND Garrett MD First United NB & TC
DAMARISCOTTA Lincoln ME The FNB ofDAMAISCOTTA
STARK VILLE Oktibbeha MS National Bank o f Commerce of Miss
ASHEBORO Randolph NC First National Bank & Trust Co.
BRANCHVILLE Sussex NJ The National Bank o f Sussex County
UNION Union NJ The Union Center National Bank
BATH Steuben NY The Bath National Bank
BRIDGEHAMPTON Suffolk NY The Bridgehampton National Bank
CANANDAIGUA Ontario NY The Canada!gua National Bank & Tr. Co.
CORTLAND Cortland NY FNB OF Cortland
EAST HAMPTON Suffolk NY The Bank of the Hamptons NA
GLOVERS VILLE Fulton NY City National Bank &. Tr. Co.
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Medium Size SHC Member Banks
(Page 2 o f 2)
CITY COUNTY/PARISH STA TE BANK NAM E
RHINEBECK Dutchess NY The FNB OF Rhinebeck
ST. CLAIRS VILLE Belmont OH Belmont National Bank
WILMINGTON Clinton OH The National Bank & Tr. Co.
ZANESVILLE Muskigum OH The FNB OF Zanesville
BERWICK Columbia PA The FNB of Berwick
BLOOMSBURG Columbia PA Columbia County Fanners National Bank
CUMBERLAND TWP Adams PA Adams County National Bank
JERMYN Lackawanna PA The FNB of Jermyn
JOHNSTOWN Cambria PA The Moxham National Bank o f Johnstown
LATROBE Westmoreland PA Commercial N. B. of Westmoreland County
LEESPORT Burks PA The FNB of Leesport
MOUNT JOY Lancaster PA The Union National ML Joy Bank
NAZARETH Northampton PA Nazareth National Bank & Tr. Co.
PHILADELPHIA Philadelphia PA Regent National Bank
POTTS VILLE Scuylkill PA The Miners National Bank
WESTCHESTER Chester PA The FNB of West Chester
ROCK HILL York SC Rock Hill National Bank
COLUMBIA Maury TN First F. & M  National Bank of Columbia
MCMINNVILLE Warren TN The FNB of McMinnville
FORT WORTH Tarrant TX Summit National Bank
MARSHALL Harrison TX First National Bank
FREDERICKSBURG Spotsylvania VA The National Bank of Fredericksburg
KILMARNOCK Lancaster VA Chesapeake National Bank
DERBY Orleans VT Community National Bank
ELKINS Randolph WV Citizens National Bank of Elkins
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Small Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 1 of 2)
CITY  CO U N TY /PA R ISH STA TE BA N K  NAM E
ANCHORAGE SouthcenL D ist AK First Interstate Bank of Alaska, NA
FORT RUCKER Dale AL Fort Rucker National Bank
ASHDOWN Little River AR The FNB in Ashdown
CAMDEN Ouachita AR Merchants & Planters Bank, NA
CHANDLER Maricopa AZ First American National Bank
MILPITAS Santa Clara CA The Bank of Milpitas, NA
AURORA Arapahoe CO FNB of Arapahoe
IGNACIO La Plata CO United Bank of Ignacio, NA
WASHINGTON DC DC Security Trust Co., NA
MONTICELLO Jefferson FL FNB o f Jefferson County
PALM BEACH Palm Beach FL Morgan Trust Co. of FL, NA
QUINCY Gadsden FL Gadsden National Bank
TALLAHASSEE Leon FL City National Bank
TARPON SPRINGS Pinellas FL First National Bank
COLUMBUS Muscogee GA SouthTrust Bank of Columbus, NA
JEFFERSON Jackson GA The FNB of Jackson County
CENTERVILLE Appanoose IA Hawkeye Bank of Centerville, NA
BATAVIA Kane JL Harris Bank Batavia, NA
ELK GROVE VILLAGE Cook IL Suburban N.B. of Elk Grove Village
GRAYVILLE White IL The Peoples National Bank o f Grayville
WILMETTE Cook IL Harris Bank Wilmette, NA
LAWRENCEBURG Anderson KY The Lawrenceburg National Bank
SCOTTS VILLE Allen KY The Fanners N. B. of Scottsville
SHELBYVILLE Shelby KY Liberty N. Bank of Shelbyville
OCEAN CITY Worchester MD Atlantic National Bank
EAST GRAND FORKS Polk MN FNB of E. Grand Forks
MARSHALL Lyon MN Community FNB
WHEATON Traverse MN Community FNB of Wheaton
HANNIBAL Marion MO Commerce Bank of Hannibal, NA
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
Small Size LHC Member Banks
(Page 2 of 2)
C ITY  COUNTY/PARISH STA TE BANK NAME
LEBANON Laclede MO Boatmen’s National Bank o f Lebanon
MONTGOMERY CITY Montgomery MO Merc. Bk. of Montgomery City, NA
LEWISTOWN Fergus MT Norwest Bank Lewistown, NA
LIDERWOOD Richland ND Community FNB of Liderwood
WAHPETON Richland ND C om m unity FNB of Wahpeton
MCCOOK Red Willow NE The FNB OF McCook
NORTH PLATTE Lincoln NE North Platt National Bank
WEST POINT Cuming NE The FNB of West Point
LAS CRUCES Dona Ana NM Sun west Bank of Las Cruces, NA
PORTALES Roosevelt NM United New Mexico Bk at Portales,
RIO RANCHO Sandoval NM Sun west Bk of Sandoval County, NA
SOCORRO Socorro NM United New Mexico Bank at Socorro,
SARATOGA SPRINGS Saratoga NY Saratoga NB & TC
LANSFORD Carbon PA The Citizens N. B. of Lansford
SPRING GROVE York PA The Spring Grove National Bank
NASHVILLE Davidson TN First American Tr. Co., NA
ATLANTA Cass TX The Atlanta National Bank
BORGER Hutchinson TX First National Bank of Barger
CANYON Randall TX The FNB in Canyon
EASTLAND Eastland TX Eastland National Bank
POST Garza TX The FNB of Post
FERRUM Franklin VA The FNB of Ferrum
RICHLANDS Tazewell VA The Richlands National Bank
SALTVUXE Smyth VA The FNB of Saltville
GENOA CITY Walworth WI American NB. & Tr. Co. o f Wise.
HARTLAND Waukesha WI M & I Lake Country National Bank
RIPON Fond Du Lac WI Valley First N. Bank of Ripon
BECKLEY Raleigh WV First National Bank
HUNTINGTON Cabell WV The Old N. Bank of Huntington
MARLINTON Pocahantas WV FNB in Marlinton
AUBURN Placer CA The Bank of Commerce, NA
COMMERCE Los Angeles CA Commerce National Bank
NAPA Napa CA Napa National Bank
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Small Size SHC Member Banks
(Page 1 of 2)
CITY COUNTY /PARISH STA TE BANK NAM E
SARATOGA Santa Clara CA Saratoga National Bank
WASHINGTON DC DC Adams National Bank
GEORGETOWN Sussex DE Delaware National Bank
CAPE CORAL Lee FL FNB of Southwest FL.
DADE CITY Pasco FL FNB of Pasco
FT. MYERS Lee FL Heritage National Bank
PONTE VEDRA SL John’s FL Ponte Vedra National Bank
PORT ST. LUCIE S t Lucie FL Port S t Lucie National Bank
STARKE Bradford FL FNB of Bradford County
VENICE Sarasota FL Comm unity N. Bank of Sarasota County
WINTER PARK Orange FL National Bank of Commerce
ASHBURN Turner GA Community National Bank
ATLANTA Fulton GA The Summit National Bank
DULUTH Gwinnett GA Gwinnett National Bank
GAINESVILLE Hall GA Lanier National Bank
JESUP Wayne GA Wayne National Bank
PEACHTREE Fayette GA Peachtree National Bank
SAVANNAH Chatham GA AmeriBank NA
TUCKER DeKalb GA Mountain National Bank
WOODSTOCK Cherokee GA North Georgia National Bank
WOODSTOCK Cherokee GA FNB of Cherokee
FAIRFIELD Jefferson IA FNB in Fairfield
GALENA Jo Daviess IL The FNB of Galena
GENOA DeKalb IL CITIZENS FNB - GENOA
LINTON Greene IN Citizens' National Bank of Linton
MAYSVILLE Mason KY The State National Bank of Maysville
LAFAYETTE Lafayette LA MidSouth National Bank
DETROIT Wayne MI First Independence N. Bank of Detroit
LANSING Ingham MI Capitol National Bank
L'ANSE Baraga MI Commercial National Bank of L'Anse
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Small Size SHC Member Banks
(Page 2 Of 2)
C IT Y COUNTY/PARISH STATE B A N K  NAM E
ROGERS CITY Presque Isle MI Huron National Bank
EUREKA Lincoln MT FNB of Eureka
WHTTEFISH Flathead MT The FNB of Whitefish
ATCO Camden NJ Equity National Bank
NEWARK Essex NJ City National Bank of NJ
WESTMONT Camden NJ Community National Bank of NJ
ATLANTA Steuben NY Atlanta National Bank
CALDWELL Noble OH The FNB o f Southeastern Ohio
OTTAWA Putnam OH The FNB o f Ottawa
ROSEBURG Douglas OR Douglas National Bank
EMLENTON Venango PA The Fanners National Bank of Emlenton
LACEYVILLE Wyoming PA The Grange N. B. of Wy Cty at L-ville
ANDERSON Anderson SC Anderson National Bank
CHARLESTON Charleston SC Bank of Charleston, NA
GREENWOOD Greenwood SC Greenwood National Bank
SPARTANBURG Spartanburg SC Spartanburg National Bank
FRANKLIN Williamson TN Franklin  National Bank
KNOXVILLE Knox TN FNB of Knoxville
ABILENE Taylor TX First State Bank, NA
FT. WORTH Tarrant TX Alta Mesa National Bank
FT. WORTH Tarrant TX Camp Bowie National Bank
ODESSA Ector TX First State Bank, NA
STAMFORD Jones TX The FNB in Stamford
REDMOND King WA Redmond National Bank
MOOREFIELD Hardy WV The S. Br. Valley N. B. ofMoorefield
PIEDMONT Mineral WV First United Bank of West Virginia, NA
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